Payments For Ecosystem Services And Wealth Disparity: An Economic Model And An Empirical Study On The Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, China by Wang, Pu
  
PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AND WEALTH DISPARITY: AN ECONOMIC 
MODEL AND AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON THE QINGHAI-TIBETAN PLATEAU, CHINA 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
By 
Pu Wang 
August 2014 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2014 Pu Wang
  
 
PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AND WEALTH DISPARITY: AN ECONOMIC 
MODEL AND AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON THE QINGHAI-TIBETAN PLATEAU, CHINA 
Pu Wang, Ph.D. 
Cornell University 2014 
This dissertation is focused on analyzing the relationship between Payments for Ecosystem 
Services (PES) and wealth disparity. Due to the fact that willingness to accept (WTA) is usually 
substantially higher than willingness to pay (WTP) for non-market environmental goods, the 
funding generated by PES projects is usually not sufficient to incentivize private landowners to 
provide Ecosystem Services (ES). The dissertation first presents an economic model to analyze 
the factors that influence WTP and WTA. Model simulation results indicate that, since high 
income people tend to have higher WTP while low income people tend to be willing to accept 
lower payments, wealth disparity between the buyers and suppliers of ES could help close the gap 
between WTP and WTA and increase the chances of ES transactions. Furthermore, the results of 
the economic model provide justifications for integrating poverty alleviation goals into PES 
programs. Next, the dissertation uses China as a specific case to demonstrate the results of the 
economic model in a real world setting. It examines China’s socioeconomic, ecological, and 
institutional contexts, and shows that the significant wealth disparity between China’s 
industrialized eastern provinces and ecosystem-services-rich western provinces could facilitate 
integrated PES and poverty alleviation programs. Finally, the dissertation presents the results of 
an empirical study on a large-scale eco-compensation program on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, 
China. Analyses of the program show that livestock herders with lower income from grazing and 
  
those with more degraded grasslands are more willing to participate in eco-compensation program 
and accept relatively lower compensation for reducing intensity of grazing. This result is consistent 
with the conclusion of the economic model that low income people are more likely to participate 
and benefit from PES projects. Results also suggest that through enrolling these herders and 
restoring their degraded grasslands, PES project could achieve ecological benefits in an 
economically efficient manner. The empirical study also suggests that scientific-based 
measurements, voluntary-based participation, and outcome-based payments are critical for PES to 
succeed in the real world.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 A historical review of payments for ecosystem services 
Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) is defined by Wunder (2005) as: 1) a voluntary transaction, 
2) where a well-defined ecosystem service (ES) (or a land-use likely to secure that service), 3) is 
being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) ES buyer, 4) from a (minimum one) ES provider, 5) if and 
only if the ES provider secures ES provision (conditionality). It has attracted increasing attention 
from scientists, policy makers, and entrepreneurs in the past decades, largely because of its promise 
that individuals’ rational behaviors could be aligned with the interests of the society as whole in 
order to achieve socially and environmentally optimal outcomes1 (Wunder, 2005). The emergence 
and mainstreaming of this concept were recent and rapid, but it has an old origin rooted in the 
anthropocentric belief of the human-environmental relationship, and a slow evolution in history. 
The significance of societal dependence on ecosystem functions has been recognized since the 
early stage of human civilization among agricultural, nomadic, and other types of societies. After 
the industrial revolution, the massive destruction of ecosystem functions caused by factory 
pollution, industrialized agriculture runoff, and urbanization raised public awareness for 
environmental protection, and stimulated the emergence of environmental sciences to better 
understand ecosystem functions. The term “ecosystem services” (ES) was first introduced by Paul 
Ehrlich and Anne Ehrlich in 1982 (Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1982), in order to add more utilitarian 
meaning to ecosystem functions and highlight the value of ecosystems to society. But at this period 
                                                 
1 The definition and rationale for PES presented in this chapter will be partly repeated in Chapters 2, 3, and 
4, because they will be submitted as independent scientific journal articles. 
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ES was mostly used as a pedagogical concept by the researchers and environmentalists to raise 
public interest for environmental protection (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010). 
The concept of ES was expanded and mainstreamed after the 1990s as an analytical tool in 
environmental research and decision-making processes related to natural resources and 
environmental management. The publication of two studies, Costanza and colleagues’ article in 
Nature (Costanza et al., 1997; Costanza et al., 2014) and the Ecosystems and human well-being 
report by Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005), generated significant influence in the 
mainstreaming of ES. Costanza and colleagues’ article estimated the monetary value of 17 
ecosystem services for 16 biomes on the earth, and stated that the value of the ES in the whole 
biosphere was about $33 trillion per year, 1.8 times of the global gross net product at that time. 
The monetary valuation of ES leads to a natural extension of traditional cost-benefit analysis, 
which internalizes the impacts of economic activities on the environment into the decision-making 
process (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010), an approach that attempts to address the social cost 
problem in Coase’s theory (Coase, 1960). The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment elaborated the 
connections between ES and human well-being, and divided ES into four types: supporting, 
provisioning, regulating, and cultural, which support various types of human well-being, including 
security, basic material for good life, health, good social relations, and freedom of choice and 
action. This report attracted much attention from policy makers and the public, and made ES one 
of the most frequently mentioned subjects in environmental dialogues (Fisher et al., 2009). 
While the valuation of ES as a policy tool focuses on use values, the rise of PES shifted the focus 
to exchange values (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010). It is very natural to think that if ecosystem 
functions are just “services” with monetary values, why could we not trade them, just as what we 
do every day for other types of services? Shortly after the valuation of ES, PES was conceptualized, 
3 
 
extensively analyzed, and implemented in various pilot projects in different regions of the world, 
even though many projects did not meet all the criteria given by Wunder (2005) and were therefore 
considered PES-like projects. Compared with traditional conservation approaches, PES is regarded 
as a more direct and efficient way, as indicated in the statement that  “the cheapest way to get 
something you want is to pay for what you want” (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002). Furthermore, PES is 
promising in expanding conservation efforts “well beyond reserves, beyond charity, and beyond 
biodiversity—and into the mainstream” (Daily and Matson, 2008). This idea was fully utilized by 
the Katoomba group, who proposed to create Markets for Ecosystem Services (MES), in which 
ES are precisely measured and cut into ES units, which can be traded by people from all over the 
world (Daily and Ellison, 2003). Two significant years for PES were 2008 and 2009, during which 
four prestigious scientific journals, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Daily and 
Matson, 2008), Ecological Economics (Engel et al., 2008), Environment and Development 
Economics (Bulte et al., 2008), and Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment (Ruffo and Kareiva, 
2009), published special issues on PES and extensively discussed the opportunities and challenges 
of it. This enthusiasm culminated in a commentary in Nature arguing that the economic downturn 
after global financial crisis in 2008 “might be the best time to include ecosystem services in the 
real economy” (Nature, 2009). 
Critiques on PES appeared at the same time this idea was created. Opponents of PES attack this 
concept from different perspectives, ranging from its basic assumptions that nature could be 
valorized and commodified, to its negative social and environmental impacts in practice. As one 
of the most important thoughts that has the potential to radically reform our public policies and 
economy, the positive and negative sides of PES must be scrutinized. This chapter reviews the 
environmental and socioeconomic promises given by the advocates of PES, as well as the 
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theoretical and empirical challenges of PES based on an extensive literature review. It then narrows 
the scope to the specific topic of PES and wealth disparity, and presents the major research 
questions and framework underpinning this dissertation. 
1.2 Economic rationales of PES 
1.2.1 Coase’s theorem: Internalize externalities 
The fundamental cause of environmental problems, from an economics perspective, is the 
generation of externalities in socioeconomic systems, or the social costs of individual behaviors 
(Coase, 1960). It could also be modeled as a “tragedy of the commons” problem, in which an 
individual’s self-interested behaviors lead to socially non-optimal outcomes (Hardin, 1968). The 
primary goal of PES, just like pollution taxes and fines, is to internalize the social costs of 
externalities in the economic system (Pagiola and Platais, 2007). The difference between PES and 
conventional environmental policies is that the former uses economic incentives to make socially 
desirable practices profitable to individuals, thus leading them to adopt the practices, while the 
latter uses disincentives to penalize individually profitable but socially undesirable practices 
(Engel et al., 2008). This shift in policy rationale is referred to as “from polluters pay to 
beneficiaries pay”.  
From the ES suppliers’ point of view, direct payment for ES makes conservation practices 
economically profitable, thus leading not only conservationists, but also corporations, 
communities and individuals to incorporate them as routines in their decision-making processes 
(Daily and Matson, 2008). From the ES buyers’ side, PES could leverage more government and 
private funding for conservation practices. In the past, conservation funding was mostly from 
government budget and private donations, which are always limited and competed by many 
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imperatives. PES provides new justifications to increase government conservation funding as well 
as funding from individual and corporate beneficiaries (Wunder et al., 2008). It was found that the 
PES projects attract on average more than four times of funding from large corporations than 
traditional biodiversity projects (Goldman et al., 2008). 
1.2.2 A market-based solution: efficiency and flexibility 
Market is regarded as a more effective and efficient way to allocate scarce resources than central 
planning systems, because it uses price signals, or the “invisible hand”, to guide individuals to 
make their own cost-benefit analyses and decisions and balance the supplies and demands of 
various goods on the market. Through decentralized decision making, market captures the nuances 
in different situations, while command and control approaches rely on centralized decision making 
and suffers from lack of local information and difficulties in enforcement and monitoring. The 
above logic is exactly the rationale for PES schemes being a more efficient alternative to command 
and control approaches (Wunder, 2005; Jack et al., 2008). 
It is widely believed that the more heterogeneous the situation is, the more efficient PES projects 
would be compared to command and control (Jack et al., 2008). A typical example to illustrate this 
argument is that if factories in a certain industry have very different emission levels, it would be 
difficult to set a universal emission limit, since a high limit would not achieve emission reduction 
goals, but a low limit would drive many factories out of business and cause significant economic 
losses. But under an emission trading scheme, factories with high emission levels could buy 
permits from those with low emission levels, and the economic costs of emission incentivize all 
factories to reduce emission. Furthermore, under a permit trading scheme, factories have freedom 
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to decide the best possible means to meet emission goals with least cost, rather than being required 
or subsidized to adopt certain predetermined practices (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002). 
1.2.3 Transaction costs, perverse incentives, and leakage 
Coase’s theorem shows that when there are clearly defined property rights and no transaction costs, 
valuating and trading externalities could result in socially optimal outcomes (Coase, 1960). But in 
reality, transaction costs always exist, and in many cases become the largest barrier in 
implementation of PES projects (Wunder et al., 2008). 
The major sources of transaction costs include: 1) measuring and validating ES, 2) costs in contract 
negotiations, and 3) monitoring and enforcing ES provisions (Wunder, 2005). The challenges in 
reducing transaction costs therefore lie not only in advancing the sciences related to the quantity, 
quality, and dynamics of ES provision, but also institutional innovations in finance, policy, and 
governance systems to facilitate the implementation of PES (Daily and Matson, 2008). High 
transaction costs make PES less attractive as a conservation approach, but some researchers argue 
that conservation itself is expensive and most of the transaction costs are not specific to PES; 
actually these costs are common for almost all the conservation actions (Wunder et al., 2008).  
While transaction costs undermine PES’s economic feasibility, perverse incentives and leakage 
problems threaten its environmental achievements. PES projects seek additional rather than 
absolute provision of ES, which makes them at risk of creating perverse incentives in two scenarios 
(Wunder et al., 2008). First, when the baseline of emission reduction is based on historical levels, 
factories might increase their emissions before the permit trading scheme is adopted in order to 
get a higher baseline. Second, if buyers are only interested in regions where ES are threatened, 
people may be induced to create such threats (Wunder et al., 2008; Vatn, 2010). The extreme case 
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of this type is sometimes called “environmental blackmail”, in which ES providers explicitly 
threaten to destroy ES if they do not receive payments.  
Leakage problems occur when PES projects displace environmental problems from the targeted 
region to other regions (Wunder, 2005; Zilberman et al., 2008). For example, a PES project may 
require a grazing ban in one region to restore grassland and reduce erosion, but the herders may 
move their livestock to a nearby pasture and cause more degradation and erosion there. Leakage 
is a prominent issue in PES projects aimed at ES that are not region-specific, such as carbon 
sequestration, because the effects of land use change in one location could be offset by opposite 
changes in other locations.  
1.3 PES and poverty alleviation 
PES projects often have social objectives in addition to their environmental benefits. Some of them 
are just considered by-products of the projects due to the specific socioeconomic contexts (Engel 
et al., 2008); but others are intended to be incorporated into the projects in order to achieve more 
political support (Wunder et al., 2008). Among many social objectives, poverty alleviation is the 
one that has been most advocated and extensively studied. 
Spatial analyses suggest that the rural poor are likely to be located on marginal lands that are prone 
to erosion, degradation, or could provide various types of ES (Bulte et al., 2008; Engel et al., 2008; 
Milder et al., 2010). Poverty could also be a major driver in unreasonable natural resources 
exploitation, which threatens many types of ES (Bulte et al., 2008). The above factors make the 
rural poor population highly eligible for many PES projects (Jack et al., 2008). Therefore, in some 
cases even though the PES projects do not specifically target the poor, they still participate in the 
projects at levels much higher than their proportion in total population (Wunder et al., 2008), and 
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the participants generally become better off if the projects are voluntary-based (Pagiola et al., 
2005). There are other cases, however, where smallholders are largely excluded due to the 
complexity or the high initial investments of the projects (Milder et al., 2010).  
Previous studies summarized the conditions for PES to benefit the poor into three categories. First, 
the poor need to be in the right place, which means that they must live in regions with high potential 
of ES provision. Second, they need to be able to participate, meaning that they need secured 
property rights for their land, as well as necessary knowledge, skills, and initial investments 
required by the projects. Third, they need to be willing to participate, which is influenced by their 
opportunity costs of alternative practices, fallback options, social and cultural preferences, and 
many other factors (Pagiola et al., 2005; Wunder et al., 2008). Even though some PES projects 
increase income of the poor, the amounts generated are usually very low and not likely to make a 
big difference to their overall income. But some researchers argue that incomes from PES are 
generally more stable than from other sources, and there are also many non-cash benefits from 
PES, such as long-term environmental gains from sustainable land management and strengthened 
social capital and local institutions (Milder et al., 2010). 
PES projects may also have side effects on employment and the urban poor. Those projects that 
require active land-use changes, such as agroforestry, are likely to create new jobs, or at the 
macroeconomic level, increase average wage levels; but other projects that simply put land in idle 
status may decrease labor demand and consequently the wage levels. Consumers and the urban 
poor are likely to be adversely affected, because PES projects decrease food supply and cause food 
prices to rise (Zilberman et al., 2008). In large-scale, government-financed projects, these macro-
level effects must be analyzed in order to understand the true costs and benefits of PES projects. 
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Many researchers warn that there are various problems with overloading PES projects with too 
many social objectives. Studies on policy design show that, in general, it is difficult to achieve 
more than one objective with a single policy tool (Zilberman et al., 2008). Empirically, an 
assessment of World Bank’s pro-poor conservation projects indicated that the success rate was 
about one in six (Daily and Matson, 2008). Whether PES schemes should incorporate poverty 
alleviation objectives becomes an important theoretical and empirical question for PES research, 
and is one of the major topics addressed in this dissertation.  
1.4 Research framework 
This dissertation is focused on identifying the enabling conditions for PES schemes, based on the 
understanding that PES has both strengths and limitations and can only work effectively in certain 
ecological, socioeconomic, and political contexts. In particular, it analyzes the relationship 
between PES and wealth disparity, and shows how the latter serves as a favorable condition for 
the former and how the former could be used as a solution to the latter.  
Following an overview of key concepts in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 presents an economic model for 
the relationship between PES and wealth disparity. It first reviews the literature on the disparity 
between willingness to accept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP), and argues that since WTA 
is usually substantially higher than WTP, the funding generated by PES projects is not always 
sufficient to incentivize private landowners to provide ES. Then an economic model is used to 
analyze the factors that influence WTP and WTA. The model simulation results indicate that, since 
high income people tend to have higher WTP while low income people tend to be willing to accept 
lower payments, wealth disparity between the buyers and suppliers of ES could help close the gap 
between WTP and WTA and increase the chances of ES transactions. Furthermore, a PES scheme 
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between wealthier and poorer regions could serve as a poverty alleviation program, because the 
private landowners are over-compensated for the ES they provide due to their high WTA and 
usually become better off if the participation is voluntary. Therefore the results of the economic 
model provide justifications for integrating poverty alleviation goals into PES programs.  
Chapter 3 uses China as a specific case to demonstrate the results of Chapter 2 in a real world 
setting. It examines China’s socioeconomic, ecological, and institutional contexts, and shows that 
the significant wealth disparity between China’s industrialized eastern provinces and ecosystem 
services rich western provinces could facilitate integrated PES and poverty alleviation programs. 
China’s property laws and fiscal and taxation systems also provide favorable conditions for the 
implementation of such programs. It is important to note, however, that China also faces significant 
challenges in implementing integrated PES and poverty alleviation programs, including the gap of 
perceptions of ecosystem services between policy makers and local people, and the gap between 
policy objectives and their realization. 
Chapter 4 presents the results of an empirical study on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, China to 
support the conclusions of the economic model. Analyses of a large-scale government-led eco-
compensation program in this region show that herders with lower income from grazing or on 
more degraded grassland are more willing to participate in eco-compensation program and accept 
relatively low compensation for changing their grazing patterns. This result is consistent with the 
conclusion of the economic model that low income people are more likely to participate and benefit 
from PES projects, and it also proves that through enrolling these herders and restoring their 
degraded grasslands PES project could achieve ecological benefits with economic efficiency. The 
empirical study also shows that scientific-based measurements, voluntary-based participation, and 
11 
 
outcome-based payments are critical for PES to succeed in the real world. The major conclusions 
and contribution of the dissertation to PES literature are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 2 AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM 
SERVICES AND WEALTH DISPARITY 
 
Abstract 
Payment for ecosystem services (PES) is often viewed as a promising market-based approach to 
internalize environmental externalities. But its effectiveness in practice is undermined by the 
relatively low willingness to pay (WTP) of the beneficiaries compared to the amount that the 
ecosystem services providers are willing to accept (WTA). This chapter uses an economic model 
to analyze the factors that influence WTP and WTA in a PES scheme, and demonstrate that certain 
level of wealth disparity between ecosystem services buyers and providers could increase the 
chances of transactions. The economic model also provides justifications for integration of PES 
and poverty alleviation programs in order to achieve more political and financial supports for the 
programs.   
2.1 Introduction 
Payment for ecosystem services (PES) is defined as a voluntary transaction of well-defined 
ecosystem service (ES) between ES providers and beneficiaries (Wunder et al., 2008). Through 
providing economic incentives, PES aligns individuals’ interests with environmental and social 
wellbeing of the society as a whole. As a market-based policy instrument, PES is also assumed to 
be more flexible and efficient than command and control approaches in addressing complex 
environmental challenges, such as non-point source pollution, biodiversity loss, and greenhouse 
gas emissions (Daily and Matson, 2008; Goldman et al., 2008). It gives individuals freedom to 
choose strategies that fit their specific situations, thus can better capture the heterogeneity of 
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environmental issues compared to one-size-fit-all approaches (Jack et al., 2008; Vatn, 2010). 
Besides the environmental benefits, many PES programs also have social targets, such as poverty 
alleviation in regions with high potential in ES provision. Studies suggest that the rural poor are 
more likely to live on marginal lands that are prone to erosion and degradation (Pagiola et al., 
2005; Bulte et al., 2008; Engel et al., 2008; Milder et al., 2010), and poverty is also a major driver 
in inappropriate natural resources exploitation that threatens many types of ecosystem services 
(Bulte et al., 2008). Thus PES could achieve both conservation and poverty alleviation goals by 
paying poorer residents to adopt environmentally friendly land management practices. 
But in reality PES projects encounter substantial obstacles in achieving the environmental and 
social goals. The major obstacles include limited funding generated by PES programs, and high 
transaction costs associated with measurement, monitoring, and enforcement in transaction 
processes (Daily and Matson, 2008; Engel et al., 2008; Milder et al., 2010). The willingness to pay 
(WTP) of ES buyers are usually much lower than the willingness to accept (WTA) of ES providers, 
which makes most PES programs economically unviable, and high transaction costs make ES even 
more unaffordable (Wunder et al., 2008; Milder et al., 2010). The fundamental reason for these 
obstacles lies in the characteristics of non-market environmental goods (Champ et al., 2003; 
Freeman, 2003). Non-market environmental goods refer to clean air, clean water, climate 
regulations, recreational functions, and various other amenities provided by the environment. They 
are integral components of the utility of individuals, but have two important distinctions from 
ordinary market goods. The first is that the access to most non-market environmental goods is non-
exclusive, which creates “free-rider” problems in PES programs. The second is that in most cases 
the quantity and quality of the non-market goods are fixed for individuals. This means that 
individuals could not change the level of non-market goods unilaterally as they could do for 
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ordinary market goods. If the society acts as a whole, however, it is possible to change the level of 
non-market goods, such as adopting new developmental or environmental policies.  
In this chapter I use an economic model to analyze the demand and supply of non-market 
environmental goods, in order to identify the conditions for PES schemes to succeed. In particular, 
this model sheds light on the relationship of PES and wealth disparity between ES buyers and 
sellers. It shows that in general higher income populations tend to have higher willingness to pay 
for ES, while lower income populations tend to be willing to accept lower payments for ES 
provision. Therefore a certain level of wealth disparity between ES buyers and sellers could close 
the gap of WTP and WTA and increase the chances of ES transactions. In addition, the model 
provides justifications for explicit integration of PES and poverty alleviation programs in order to 
gather more political and financial support. The rest of the chapter is organized as following. 
Section 2 provides theoretical explanations for the disparity between WTP and WTA and its 
implications to PES schemes; section 3 shows the construction of the economic model; section 4 
uses the model to analyze the relationship of PES and wealth disparity; and section 5 concludes 
the chapter and discusses the potential critiques to the model. 
2.2 Disparity in WTP and WTA and the implications to PES 
Measurement of welfare changes is usually based on Hicksian demand function. Hicks (1946) 
developed two indicators to measure welfare change, namely equivalent variation (EV) and 
compensating variation (CV). Brookshire and colleagues (Brookshire et al., 1980), as well as other 
researchers (Johansson, 1987; Lankford, 1988), introduced Hicks’ methods  into environmental 
economics, and developed two similar techniques for choice and welfare under quantity constraints 
or imposed quantities, namely equivalent surplus (ES) and compensating surplus (CS). Let the 
utility function be u(x, q), in which u is the utility level, x is the vector of quantities for different 
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market goods, and q is the vector of environmental goods. Let w be the wealth of an individual, 
then Marshallian demand function is x = (p, w-r∙q, q), in which p is the vector of prices for market 
goods, and r is the vector of prices for environmental goods. The indirect utility function becomes 
v=v(p, w-r∙q, q), with v representing the indirect utility level, or the utility value of the solution to 
the utility maximization problem (UMP), and the expenditure function becomes e = e(p, r, q, u), 
with e representing the solution to the expenditure minimization problem (EMP). ES and CS could 
be written in the form of expenditure function:  
ES = e(p, r, q0, u1)-e(p, r, q1, u1) = e(p, r, q0, u1)-w   (1) 
CS = e(p, r, q0, u0)-e(p, r, q1, u0) = w-e(p, r, q1, u0)   (2) 
The explicit representation of environmental goods in these functions allows us to analyze a set of 
welfare change problems associated environmental goods, in which the changes caused by 
environmental policies are in the quantity or quality of environmental goods, rather than in the 
prices of ordinary market goods. In a PES scheme, CS represents the WTP to increase 
environmental goods holding utility at the initial level, while ES represents the WTA to forgo an 
increase in environmental goods, using the alternative level of utility as a reference. 
In theory WTP and WTA should be about the same when wealth effect, or the income elasticity of 
demand for the commodity, is not significant (Willig, 1976). But there are abundant empirical 
studies showing that in practice WTA and WTP could differ significantly. Particularly, WTA is 
usually substantially higher than WTP (Horowitz and McConnell, 2002). This phenomenon exists 
in experiments for various types of goods, ranging from Coffee mugs and movie tickets, to public 
and environmental goods, and on average, the ratio of WTA/WTP is seven (Horowitz and 
McConnell, 2002). Researchers try to explain this disparity from different perspectives.  
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Hanemann (1991) shows that the difference between WTA and WTP is determined not only by 
the income effect, but also by a substitution effect, which means there are other commodities 
available to be substituted for the given goods and maintain the utility at the same level. Hanemann 
further showed that with the same income effect, the smaller the substitution effect is, the greater 
the disparity would be. And for public goods, the substitution effect could have much larger 
influence on the disparity than the income effect (Hanemann, 1991). Hanemann’s findings are 
consistent with Horowitz and McConnell’s review of WTA and WTP experiments (Horowitz and 
McConnell, 2002). Horowitz and McConnell found out that the less a good is like an “ordinary 
market good”, the higher the ratio of WTA/WTP would be. The ratio is relatively low for marketed 
private goods, and much higher for public goods, or goods and services associated with health and 
safety (Horowitz and McConnell, 2002). Besides the explanations based on neoclassical 
preference theories, psychologists have long noticed the phenomenon that people are more averse 
to a loss than attracted to an equivalent gain (Coursey et al., 1987), and they call this behavior 
“loss aversion” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The psychological and behavioral explanations 
of loss aversion include endowment effect, legitimacy, ambiguity, and responsibility (Brown and 
Gregory, 1999). Endowment effect means that people tend to think things that are a part of their 
wealth more valuable than the same things that are not. Legitimacy problems refer to people’s 
reactions to those proposed transactions that are not likely to happen in reality, such as buying or 
selling one’s safety or the existence of a species. Ambiguity problems exist in many experiments 
to assess WTA or WTP, and people’s nature of risk aversion lead to low WTP and high WTA. A 
sense of responsibility for other people or for the environment could also cause the disparity of 
WTA and WTP compared to rational choices. 
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Even though there are various attempts to explain the large disparities between WTA and WTP, 
this problem remains quite elusive, and becomes a bottleneck for valuation and assessment in 
environmental economics. Furthermore, it has very important implications on the effectiveness of 
PES schemes, as well as on the initial assignment of property rights, since the difference in WTA 
and WTP indicates that initial allocation of property rights matters, which is contrary to the 
underlying assumption of PES based on Coase’s theorem. 
In his famous article, The problem of social cost, Coase (1960) presented a very important thought 
in modern environmental economics, which was summarized by later researchers as “Coase’s 
theorem”. The basic idea of Coase’s theorem is that when there are clearly defined property rights 
and no transaction costs, stakeholders could negotiate and reach agreements that could internalize 
all the externalities with maximal efficiency. Different initial assignments of property rights would 
determine who gains and who loses, but have no effects on the ultimate allocation of resources. 
Coase’s Theorem serves as a corner stone for neoliberal environmentalism, which opposes 
excessive government intervention and advocate for expansion of market mechanisms into natural 
resources and environmental services domains (Robertson, 2004; Bakker, 2005; Castree, 2008). 
PES emerged in this background as a promising approach to align individuals’ incentives with 
environmental conservation objectives. An underling assumption of PES is that, in the ideal world 
of zero transaction costs and clearly defined property rights, negotiation of different parties would 
yield an ecologically optimal outcome with economic efficiency. Different initial property right 
assignments would not affect this optimum, indicating that the effect of imposing an environmental 
tax to the polluters would be equivalent to that of paying the polluters to reduce their environmental 
damage (Brown and Gregory, 1999; Stavins, 2003). The disparity between WTA and WTP 
discussed above, however, raises serious challenges for PES rationales.  
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First, the high ratio of WTA/WTP indicates that actual transactions in a PES scheme would be 
much less than expected amount for achieving ecological objectives, because the funding 
generated by PES program (WTP) is not adequate to incentivize ES providers (WTA). Second, the 
initial assignments of property rights become important when there is disparity between WTA and 
WTP, and this could have significant effects on environmental policies. A high ratio of WTA/WTP 
means that holders of certain goods or rights value them much higher than non-holders (Horowitz 
and McConnell, 2002). In the context of PES, if the land is held by private landowners, and the 
government wants to preserve the land from development, the government would need to pay a 
price many times higher than in the case that the government itself has the ownership of the land. 
At the same time, this finding undermines the argument that PES is more efficient than command 
and control approaches, and requires reexamining and reassessing different policy instruments in 
different scenarios. And at last, the interacting effects of WTA/WTP disparity and transaction costs 
create more barriers for PES programs. Coase suggested that even though there are transaction 
costs, free negotiation could still lead to efficient outcomes, just as the case of ordinary market 
goods that also have certain level of transaction costs (Dixit and Olson, 2000). But it is obvious 
that transaction costs in ecosystem services trading are overwhelmingly high due to lack of 
knowledge, techniques, and institutional settings. When high WTA/WTP disparity and high 
transaction costs exist simultaneously, actual transactions would hardly be able to happen. 
While the disparity of WTP and WTA and high transaction costs raise serious challenges for the 
application of PES, they also shed lights on new directions of PES research and design. PES is not 
a silver bullet for any environmental problem in any place. To be effective and efficient, it requires 
certain socioeconomic and ecological conditions that need to be identified. The high WTA/WTP 
ratio also provides justification for the government to offer compensation higher than the market 
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value of the products of private land, and makes it necessary for the government to integrate 
environmental and poverty alleviation objectives in order to gather more political and financial 
resources. The economic model presented below helps identify the favorable conditions for PES 
programs, and advocates for explicit integration of PES and poverty alleviation programs. 
2.3 Model construction 
In this model I assume that urban residents are potential ES buyers, and rural population, or private 
landowners, are potential ES providers. Utility function of urban people is u=u(x, q), with the 
budget restriction I=p∙x+r∙q, where x is the amount of market goods, p is price of market goods, q 
is the amount of ecosystem services which is generally fixed and everyone has the same level, r is 
the rate charged for q, and I is income level. A Cobb-Douglas utility function is used in this model, 
in the form of:  
u=K∙xα∙q1-α           (3)  
This utility function has the following property: 
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑥
> 0,
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑞
> 0,
𝜕2𝑢
𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑞
> 0. 
According to Hicks’s welfare theory, WTP could be represented by compensating surplus (CS), 
which means the maximal value the buyer is willing to pay to increase ecosystem services and 
maintain utility at the initial level. If the expenditure function for a consumer is e = e(p, r, q, u), 
then CS could be written in the following form:  
CS = e(p, r, q0, u0) - e(p, r, q0+∆q, u0) = I - e(p, r, q0+∆q, u0)   (4) 
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In which q0 is the original level of ecosystem services, and ∆q is the increase in ecosystem services 
after a PES program is implemented. Note that e=p∙x+r∙q if x and q are the solution for utility 
maximization problem. 
Let x0 denote the original level of consumption of market goods, u
0 denotes the original utility 
level, and x1 denotes consumption of market goods after ecosystem services are increased but the 
utility level is maintained at u0. Then we have: 
u0 = K∙ x1α∙(q0+∆q)1-α = K∙ x0α∙(q0)1-α           (5) 
Solve this equation we get:  
x1 = x0∙(
q0
q0+∆q
)
1−𝛼
𝛼                                         (6) 
Note that I = p∙x0+r∙q0, and when q0 is fixed,  
x0 = 
I−r∙q0
p
         (7) 
Therefore, 
WTP = I - e(p, r, q0+∆q, u0) = I – p∙x1 – r∙( q0+∆q)            (8) 
Insert equations (6) and (7) into equation (8), we get: 
WTP = (1- (
q0
q0+∆q
)
1−𝛼
𝛼 )∙I + r∙(
q0
q0+∆q
)
1−𝛼
𝛼 ∙q0 – r∙( q0+∆q)      (9) 
To simplify the analysis, we set the rate for ecosystem services (r) equal to 0, which makes sense 
for most ecosystem services that are open access. Therefore,  
WTP = (1- (
q0
q0+∆q
)
1−𝛼
𝛼 )∙I                      (10) 
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In this equation there are three parameters that determine WTP: income level I, the relative 
importance of ecosystem services in one’s utility function α, and the ratio of ∆q/q0.  
Rural people are all small landowners, and their income from land is i =paf(l), in which p is the 
price of products, a is the area of their land, l is labor input, and f(l) is production function. The 
landowners could quit agriculture or grazing activities and retire their land in order to provide 
ecosystem services, and they could find alternative jobs with wages s and alternative income w∙l. 
The landowners choose to participate in PES projects if the payment P>= paf(l) - s∙l=i - s∙l.  Let s∙l 
= β∙i, then the condition for participation becomes: 
P>= (1-β)∙i.             (11) 
β could be interpreted as the ratio of alternative income and original income. In other words, 
WTA = (1-β)∙i             (12) 
In equilibrium, P=WTA=WTP. Define income density function for urban residents: φ1(I) and for 
rural residents: φ2(i). Let Im be the highest income of urban residents. Then the demand function 
of ES is:  
𝐷 = ∫ 𝜑1(𝐼)𝑑𝐼
𝐼𝑚
𝐼(𝑃)
              (13) 
The supply function of ES is:  
𝑆 = ∫ 𝜑2(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
𝑖(𝑃)
0
               (14) 
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2.4 Model analyses and results 
According to equations (13) and (14), if we know the income density functions φ1(I) for urban 
residents and φ2(i) for rural residents, we can calculate the price per unit of ES and the quantity of 
ES traded in equilibrium. In this section I assume specific distributions of wealth among each 
population, and run simulations to see how different values of the parameters could change WTP 
and WTA, thus change the welfare gain from PES projects. 
There are four factors that could change WTP and WTA: wealth distribution among population, 
which determines the forms of φ1(I) and φ2(i); the relative importance of ecosystem services in 
one’s utility function, α; the ratio of ∆q/q0; and the ratio of alternative income and original income 
of the rural residents, β. To simplify the analysis, I assume that there is a uniform distribution of 
population density on a continuum of income levels. This means if the range of income in the 
whole population is [a, b], then for any point between a and b, the population density is the same. 
I first set α, β, and ∆q/q0 as constants to see the effects of income distribution or inequality on the 
environmental surplus of PES projects, which is a similar concept with consumer surplus, used to 
measure the welfare gain from PES projects.  
Figure 2.1 shows the environmental surplus in four different scenarios. While the total income is 
the same in all four graphs, (a) and (c) have approximately the same Gini coefficient of 0.33, while 
(b) and (d) have the same Gini coefficient of 0.16. In (a) and (b) it is assumed that there is regional 
wealth disparity, which means that the wealthier half of population live in urban areas and are ES 
buyers, while the poorer half live in rural areas and are ES providers. In (c) and (d) it is assumed 
that there is no regional wealth disparity, which means there are rich and poor people in both urban 
and rural areas. The downward sloping curve represents WTP, while the upward sloping curve 
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represents WTA. The triangles formed by vertical axis and the two curves represent the total 
amount of environmental surplus. From figure 2.1 we can see that the Gini coefficient, the indicator 
of wealth disparity, has a significant influence on the amount of environmental surplus: the larger 
the Gini coefficient is (in (a) and (c), the more the environmental surplus could be achieved from 
PES project. Besides the influence of Gini coefficient in the whole population, regional wealth 
distribution is also an important factor: the scenarios with regional wealth disparity (in (a) and (b)) 
have larger environmental surplus from PES than those without regional wealth disparity (in (c) 
and (d)).  
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Figure 2.1 Environmental surplus of PES projects in different scenarios.  
This model could also be used to simulate scenarios with different α, ∆q/q0, β, and transaction 
costs. According to equations (10) and (12):  
𝜕𝑊𝑇𝑃
𝜕α
< 0,
∂WTP
∂ (
∆q
q0)
> 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
∂WTA
∂β
< 0. 
Therefore, smaller α will lead to higher WTP, larger ∆q/q0 will lead to higher WTP, and larger β 
will lead to lower WTA, which will all increase the environmental surplus from PES projects.  
Results of the model simulations above identify the favorable conditions for PES programs to be 
effective. First, higher wealth disparity, particularly regional wealth disparity between ES buyers 
and ES suppliers, could increase the chances of ES transactions. This is because when all other 
conditions are equal, on the one hand, high income population are likely to have higher willingness 
to pay, because their spending on ES is a relatively small fraction of their income; on the other 
hand, low income population are likely to be willing to accept lower payments, because their 
opportunity costs for ES provision are relatively low, and they have incentives to seek for 
alternative livelihoods in order to improve their standard of living. Second, environmental attitudes, 
or the awareness of the significance of ES, play an important role in PES. Societies with high 
awareness of the values of ES are more likely to be successful in PES programs. Third, WTP has 
positive correlation with expectation of the PES programs: the ES buyers are willing to pay more 
if they expect that the PES programs could significantly improve ES provision. And at last, ES 
suppliers are more willing to participate in PES programs and accept lower payments if they have 
alternative income sources that could largely compensate their losses in ES provision. 
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2.5 Discussion 
PES schemes are a promising market-based approach to addressing complex environmental issues, 
particularly when private landowners are involved. But the high ratio of WTA and WTP and the 
overwhelmingly high transaction costs undermine the effectiveness of PES schemes in the real 
world. The economic model proposed in this chapter helps identify the favorable conditions for 
PES schemes to overcome these obstacles and target at the regions and populations with high 
potential in participating PES programs. Simulations of the economic model indicate that wealth 
disparity between ES suppliers and buyers is a critical condition for the success of PES. Very few 
transactions would happen in PES if the wealth disparity is not significant, and in such situations 
environmental tax or government regulation might be better options rather than PES. 
In practice a free market for ES is not likely to emerge because of the free-rider problem on the 
ES buyers’ side. Ecosystem services are non-exclusive benefits, thus the beneficiaries of the 
services do not have incentive to pay for them, because they can always take “free rides” as long 
as others buy the services. Therefore, PES projects in reality are mostly in the forms of regulation-
driven market, or the government serves as the buyer. In a regulation-driven market, the 
government mandates certain groups of people to pay for ES, such as real estate developers who 
generate negative impacts on the environment, in order to create demands for ES. Or the 
government could impose taxes on certain groups of people, and use the money to pay for ES. 
Even though the demand side of PES is not voluntary-based, the analysis of potential buyers in 
this model is still indispensable since it provides basis and justifications for the government to 
design the regulations or taxes. 
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The economic model could be applied at different geographical scales, ranging from localized PES 
projects, such as an upstream-downstream water quality trading program (Peisert and Sternfeld, 
2005; Zheng and Zhang, 2006), to national level projects, such as the Slope Land Conversion 
program in China (Liu et al., 2008a), in which farmers on marginal lands are paid to convert their 
less productive lands to plantations, and to international programs, most famously the REDD+, in 
which the developed countries provide funding to the developing countries for reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation (Corbera and Schroeder, 2011). More details on the 
features of these programs and their relevance to the model are discussed in Chapter 3.  
This model also provides important justifications for integrated PES and poverty alleviation 
programs. Some researchers argue that PES programs should not include a poverty alleviation 
objective, since it will distract the focus of the programs from environmental improvement (Engel 
et al., 2008; Gauvin et al., 2010; Milder et al., 2010). But this model shows that the government 
needs to pay landowners compensation much higher than the market value of their actual loss in 
order to incentivize ES provision. This over-payment could only be justified if the landowners are 
in poverty and need external assistance to help them escape a poverty trap. In other words, poverty 
alleviation objective could help PES programs gather more political and financial supports. This 
explains why most real world PES schemes, such as the Slope Land Conversion program in China 
(Bennett, 2008), and the REDD+ program between developed and developing countries (Corbera 
and Schroeder, 2011), all have explicit poverty alleviation objectives. After all, ecosystem services 
are not ordinary market goods, so their transactions require unconventional market mechanisms. 
In Chapter 3 I will use China as a specific case to demonstrate the results of Chapter 2 in a real 
world setting.  
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CHAPTER 3 INTEGRATING PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AND 
POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROGRAMS IN CHINA: OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CHALLENGES 
 
Abstract 
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) programs use market mechanisms to address 
environmental problems and provide social benefits. This study reviews the conditions for PES 
programs to achieve both the environmental and social goals, and argues that regional wealth 
disparity between ecosystem services suppliers and buyers can enhance PES programs’ ability to 
improve environmental quality and alleviate poverty in ecosystem services rich regions. When 
wealth disparity is not significant, other policy tools, such as environmental tax or regulations, 
might be preferred to PES.  It then examines China’s socioeconomic, ecological, and institutional 
contexts, and demonstrates that the significant wealth disparity between China’s industrialized 
eastern provinces and the ecosystem services rich western provinces could facilitate the integrated 
PES and poverty alleviation programs in China. China’s property laws and fiscal and taxation 
systems also provide favorable conditions for the implementation of such programs. It is important 
to note, however, that China also faces significant challenges in implementing integrated PES and 
poverty alleviation programs, including the gap of perceptions of ecosystem services between 
policy makers and the local people, and the gap between policy objectives and their realization. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) has emerged as a promising environmental policy 
innovation in the past two decades. A widely used definition of PES is given by Wunder (2005) 
as: 1) a voluntary transaction, 2) where a well-defined ecosystem service (ES) (or a land-use likely 
to secure that service), 3) is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) ES buyer, 4) from a (minimum 
one) ES provider, 5) if and only if the ES provider secures ES provision (conditionality).  But 
many researchers regard PES as a much more inclusive concept, involving government agencies, 
third party intermediaries, and trading parties, and having goals beyond simply increasing 
ecosystem services provision (Farley and Costanza, 2010; Cranford and Mourato, 2011; Muradian, 
2013). PES has attracted increasing attention from arenas of academia, policy making, and 
industries in the past two decades (Costanza et al., 1997; MEA, 2005), largely because of its 
promise that through providing economic incentives, individuals’ rational behaviors could be 
aligned with the interests of the society as whole in order to achieve socially and environmentally 
optimal outcomes. PES also emerged as a response to the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of 
relying on command and control approaches to address problems such as non-point pollutions, 
biodiversity loss, and greenhouse gas emissions (Mazmanian and Kraft, 2009). As a market-based 
approach, it has many assumed advantages over command and control methods, such as more 
efficiency and flexibility, and using incentives and competition mechanisms to encourage 
innovations. Another major difference between PES and conventional environmental policies is 
that the former uses economic incentives to make socially desirable practices profitable to 
individuals, thus leading them to adopt the practices, while the latter uses disincentives to penalize 
individually profitable but socially undesirable practices (Engel et al., 2008). This shift in policy 
rationale is referred to as “from polluters pay to beneficiaries pay”. 
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In addition to environmental objectives, many PES projects also have social objectives, such as 
poverty alleviation, regional development, and increasing job opportunities, and poverty 
alleviation stands out as the most important social objective in many PES projects (Wunder et al., 
2008; Farley and Costanza, 2010; Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013; Wynne-Jones, 2013). The 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment of 2005 (MEA, 2005) shows that ecosystem degradation 
processes have uneven impacts on the economically disadvantaged groups. Spatial analyses 
suggest that the rural poor are likely to be located on marginal lands that are prone to erosion, 
degradation, or could provide various types of ecosystem services (Bulte et al., 2008; Engel et al., 
2008; Milder et al., 2010). Poverty could also be a major driver in unreasonable natural resources 
exploitation, which threatens many types of ecosystem services (Bulte et al., 2008). The above 
factors make the rural poor population highly eligible for many PES projects (Jack et al., 2008). 
Therefore, in some cases even though the PES projects do not specifically target the poor, they 
still participate in the projects in numbers much higher than their proportion in total population 
(Wunder et al., 2008), and the participants generally become better off if the projects are voluntary-
based (Pagiola et al., 2005). There are other cases where smallholders are, however, largely 
excluded due to the complexity or the high initial investments of the projects (Milder et al., 2010). 
Despite the theoretical promises, successful stories about either ordinary PES or pro-poor PES are 
not prevalent, usually because the funding generated by PES projects is not sufficient to incentivize 
people to participate, the transaction costs are overwhelmingly high, or the institutional 
frameworks are generally lacking (Milder et al., 2010). Due to these critical barriers, PES projects 
can only be successful under certain circumstances, where a series of socioeconomic, institutional, 
geographical, and ecological conditions are satisfied. Identifying these critical conditions, and 
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subsequently targeting the right group of people in the right places, become the most important 
prerequisites for the success of PES projects. 
Scholars and practitioners are impressed by the number and scales of government-led PES 
programs undertaking in China (Zheng and Zhang, 2006; Bennett, 2009). The most famous 
examples include the Cropland Conversion Program, which enrolled more than 120 million 
farmers and aimed to increase vegetation cover by 32 million ha by 2010 (Liu et al., 2008a; Chen 
et al., 2010), and the Three River Sources Region Ecosystem Restoration Program, which provides 
economic incentives to herders in 16 counties to reduce livestock density on the grassland and 
change their grazing practices (Zhou et al., 2005). One shared feature of these large-scale programs 
is that besides environmental conservation objectives they usually also have explicit poverty 
alleviation considerations. There are also many relatively small scale projects at local level, mostly 
focused on water rights transferring and mining management. It is arguable that these programs in 
China cannot meet the strict definition of PES, because most of them are not truly voluntary, and 
the fact that the government playing a dominant role in the programs undercuts the efficacy of 
market mechanisms. Actually in China they are mostly referred to as eco-compensation programs 
rather than PES. But since “pure” PES programs are rarely observed anywhere in the world, and 
the majority of researchers acknowledge that the government is necessary, at least transitionally, 
in the establishment of PES schemes, these eco-compensation programs are still considered PES 
under the broader definition. In this sense China is actually one of the leading countries that has 
rich experiences in both theoretical explorations and implementation of PES programs, and the 
future expansion and improvements of these programs are also very promising, which has attracted 
researchers worldwide to study on PES in China (Bennett, 2009).  
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The success of PES logic in China is not accidental and can be attributed to specific socioeconomic 
and environmental features of China. Analysis of the reasons of this success would have significant 
meanings for further development of such projects in China. But to my best knowledge, such a 
“big picture analysis” of the linkages between China’s special characteristics and the success of 
PES programs has yet been done. The purpose of this chapter is first to identify the barriers that 
prevent PES and poverty alleviation projects from being effective, and seek for conditions and 
strategies that can overcome these barriers; we then explore the socioeconomic and ecological 
factors of China, and argue that China meets some of the most critical conditions for PES and 
poverty alleviation projects to be successful, and has great opportunities for improving and 
expanding such projects. The contents of the chapter are organized as follow. Section 2 explores 
the most common and significant barriers in PES and poverty alleviation projects; section 3 
presents the major arguments of this chapter, including the favorable conditions for PES and 
poverty alleviation projects, as well as case studies to illustrate the arguments; sections 4 and 5 
review China’s ecological, socioeconomic, and institutional contexts; and finally section 6 
discusses the opportunities and challenges for China to implement integrated PES and poverty 
alleviation projects.  
3.2 Barriers for pro-poor PES programs 
The origin of the rationale of using market mechanisms to solve environmental problems is 
arguably the Coase’s Theorem. In his famous article, The problem of social cost, Coase (1960) 
argued that: 
When there are clearly defined property rights and no transaction costs, stakeholders could 
negotiate and reach agreements that could internalize all the externalities with maximal 
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efficiency. Different initial assignments of rights would determine who gains and who 
loses, but have no effects on the ultimate allocation of resources. 
Coase’s theorem identified two of the most important conditions for PES to be effective: clearly 
defined property rights and no transaction costs. And for PES with poverty alleviation objectives, 
there are more conditions that need to be satisfied. Previous studies summarized the conditions 
into three categories (Pagiola et al., 2005; Wunder et al., 2008): first, the poor need to be in the 
right place, which means that they must live in regions with high potential of ES provision; second, 
they need to be able to participate, meaning that they need secured property rights for their land, 
as well as necessary knowledge, skills, and initial investments required by the projects; and third, 
they need to be willing to participate, which is influenced by their opportunity costs of alternative 
practices, fallback options, social and cultural preferences, as well as many other factors. 
But in the real world PES projects meet substantial obstacles because of the difficulties satisfying 
these conditions. Firstly, it is implied by Coase’s theorem that in theory willingness to pay (WTP) 
for ecosystem services and willingness to accept (WTA) the payment for providing ecosystem 
services should be about the same, so that initial property assignments would not affect the 
outcome of PES projects. But in reality, many empirical studies show that WTA is significantly 
higher than WTP; particularly, the less a good is like an “ordinary market good”, the higher the 
ratio of WTA/WTP would be. And for environmental goods, or ecosystem services, the average 
ratio in various studies is seven (Horowitz and McConnell, 2002; Horowitz and McConnell, 2003). 
The disparity between WTA and WTP raises serious challenges for the PES rationale. On the one 
hand, the high ratio of WTA/WTP indicates that the economically efficient outcome for 
environmental goods is unlikely to be achieved, even without transaction costs. On the other hand, 
the initial assignments of property rights become important when there is disparity between WTA 
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and WTP, and this could have significant effects on environmental policies. A high ratio of 
WTA/WTP means that holders of certain goods or rights value them much higher than non-holders 
(Horowitz and McConnell, 2002). In the context of PES, if the land is held by private landowners, 
and the government wants to preserve the land from development, the government would need to 
pay a price many times higher than in the case that the government itself has the ownership of the 
land. At the same time, this finding undermines the argument that PES is more cost-effective than 
command and control approaches, and requires reexamining and reassessing different policy 
instruments in different scenarios. 
Secondly, the interacting effects of WTA/WTP disparity and transaction costs make the analysis 
of PES even more complex. Coase (1960) seemed to suggest that even though there are transaction 
costs, free negotiation could still lead to efficient outcomes, just as the case of ordinary market 
goods that also observe certain level of transaction costs (Dixit and Olson, 2000). But it is obvious 
that transaction costs in ecosystem services trading are overwhelmingly high, which makes actual 
transactions hardly able to happen, not to say solving environmental problems. The high 
transaction costs are mostly due to lack of scientific knowledge and efficient techniques for 
measuring, monitoring, and valuating ecosystem services, and the tedious and expensive 
procedures for ensuring the delivery of ecosystem services. The implications of the situation when 
high WTA/WTP disparity and high transaction costs exist simultaneously are still unclear, but 
definitely worth being carefully examined. 
And thirdly, defining clear property rights for ecosystem services is extremely difficult in practice. 
Many types of ecosystem services do not have physical boundaries, and their recipients are non-
exclusive. Individuals do not have direct incentives to pay voluntarily for carbon sequestration or 
biodiversity conservation in a remote forest, because they can take a “free ride” as long as others 
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pay for the ecosystem services. This is actually one of the important reasons for the low WTP 
compared to WTA. The fact that benefits of ecosystem services are shared by certain group of 
people, rather than divided and consumed by individuals, makes voluntary payments unlikely to 
happen and further limits the funding generated from PES projects. This problem could be fixed 
by creating a regulation-driven market, in which the government mandates payments from certain 
groups of people, such as developers who generate negative impacts on the environment, in order 
to create demands for ecosystem services; or the government could serve as the representative for 
the beneficiaries and pay for ecosystem services, like in the case of eco-compensation programs. 
But such schemes have equity and efficiency concerns, and the institutional settings for them are 
usually absent or weak.  
In summary, the barriers for integrated PES and poverty alleviation projects are mostly because of 
the limited funding created from PES projects, the high transaction costs, and lack of institutional 
settings. Because of the disparity between WTA and WTP, the funding generated by PES projects 
would compose only a small proportion of the overall income even for the impoverished 
households, and thus is not sufficient to incentivize large proportion of potential ecosystem 
services suppliers to participate in the projects. Furthermore, high transaction costs significantly 
impede the transactions, and lastly, property rights for environmental goods are difficult to define, 
and the institutional settings for the defining, measure, and trading of ecosystem services are 
lacking. 
3.3 PES and wealth disparity 
Existing studies on pro-poor PES mostly focus on the relationship between poverty and natural 
resources degradation, and seek strategies to lift the poor out of a poverty trap (poverty reduction) 
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or ensure people maintain a minimum standard of living (poverty prevention) (Ross, 1999; Sachs 
and Warner, 2001; Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003; Mehlum et al., 2006; Frankel, 2010). But this 
study argues that the poor population in natural resources rich regions represents the supply side 
of ecosystem services. For PES projects, equally important is the demand side of ecosystem 
services, which are the people in economically more developed regions who desire premium 
ecosystem services or need to buy credits to offset their impacts on the environment. The rich 
population on demand side has long been underemphasized, but they form the whole picture of a 
PES program together with the suppliers of ecosystem services (figure 3.1). It is this wealth 
disparity between industrialized regions and ecosystem services rich regions, not just poverty, 
which makes PES projects ecologically and socially desirable. 
 
Figure 3.1 Wealth disparity between the demand side and supply side of Payments for Ecosystem 
Services (PES) projects 
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PES is a potential solution for mitigating wealth disparity and ecosystem degradation, and larger 
wealth disparity also increases the likelihood of transactions in PES projects. This is because on 
the one hand, high income people are more likely to have high willingness to pay, because their 
spending on ecosystem services is a relatively small fraction of their income. Various industries 
may also need to buy ecosystem services credits in order to offset their negative environmental 
impacts under a regulation-driven market. On the other hand, the low income people in ecosystem 
services rich regions are likely to be willing to accept lower payments, because their opportunity 
costs for ecosystem services provision are relatively low, and they have incentives to seek for 
alternative livelihoods in order to improve their standards of living. It is noteworthy to point out 
that besides wealth disparity, differences in population densities are also an important factor for 
PES projects. High population density in the industrialized regions means that there are more 
buyers of ecosystem services and the aggregated WTP would be higher; low population density in 
the ecosystem services rich regions means that each of the providers could receive a relatively 
large share of payments in the project.  
In the next step, we select a series of well-known PES projects both within China and in other 
countries to show that most of them satisfy the conditions for wealth disparity and population 
density discussed above. Table 3.1 provides a summary of 10 PES projects widely known to 
scholars in this field, five selected from China, and five from other developed and developing 
countries. These projects range from local scale (cases 3, 4, 5, 6, 7), to national scale (cases 1, 2, 
9, 10) and international scale (case 8). They provide various ecosystem services, including soil 
erosion control, water conservation, carbon sequestration, and biodiversity, and are financed and 
administrated under different schemes. But they have one common feature that, generally speaking, 
the ecosystem services suppliers are located in rural areas relatively less economically developed, 
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while the ecosystem services beneficiaries are located in more developed regions, in most cases 
urban areas. At the same time, the latter regions usually have higher population densities than the 
former. This phenomenon is more obvious in the local scale cases. In cases 3 and 6, Beijing and 
New York City are both megacities with huge water consumption volumes, and they have 
sufficient willingness and financial ability to pay their neighboring rural landowners to protect 
their water sources. In case 4, Yiwu County, China is a highly developed region with prosperous 
second and third industries, but does not have sufficient water supply within the county; while the 
neighboring Dongyang County is mostly agricultural areas and has much lower GDP per capita 
compared to Yiwu, but has surplus water resources. These differences facilitate the water right 
transfer scheme between the two counties, and created a win-win scenario. In case 5, Lijiang, 
China is a popular eco-tourism destination in China, but the water quality is threatened by 
surrounding agricultural regions. So the tourist industry has a high willingness to pay the 
subsistence farmers to adopt more environmentally friendly practices. Case 7 also involves 
downstream water users paying herders grazing on steep slopes to reduce salinity. 
 
Table 3.1 Examples of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) projects and wealth disparity 
between ecosystem services (ES) suppliers and beneficiaries 
Project No. 
and name 
Country Type of ES 
provided 
ES suppliers ES beneficiaries References 
1. Cropland 
conversion 
program 
China Soil erosion 
control, water 
conservation, 
flood control 
Small farmers on 
marginal land in 
provinces on upper 
and middle reaches 
of Yangtze and 
Yellow Rivers 
Central government 
finances the project. 
The beneficiaries are 
the whole country, 
but particularly the 
residents in 
downstream cities. 
(Liu et al., 
2008a; Chen 
et al., 2010; 
Gauvin et al., 
2010; Yin and 
Zhao, 2012) 
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2. Three River 
Sources 
ecosystem 
restoration 
program 
China Headwaters 
protection, 
soil erosion 
control, 
biodiversity 
Subsistence herders 
in the headwater 
regions of Yangtze, 
Yellow, and 
Lancang Rivers 
Central government 
finances the project. 
Beneficiaries 
include residents in 
both agricultural and 
industrial regions 
downstream 
(Zhou et al., 
2005) 
3. Beijing-
Miyun 
integrated 
watershed 
management  
China Water source 
protection 
Small farmers 
around Miyun 
Reservoir, which is 
the major water 
source of Beijing 
Residents and 
industries in the City 
of Beijing 
(Peisert and 
Sternfeld, 
2005; Liu and 
Yang, 2013) 
4. Yiwu-
Dongyang 
water rights 
transfer 
scheme 
China Water use 
rights 
Less developed 
Dongyang County 
Highly developed 
Yiwu County 
(Zheng and 
Zhang, 2006; 
Bennett, 
2009) 
5. Lashihai 
Nature 
Reserve, 
Yunnan 
Province 
China Water source 
protection 
Subsistence 
farmers in upper 
watershed 
Tourist industry; 
citizens in city of 
Lijiang 
(Bennett, 
2009) 
 
6. New York 
City 
watershed 
protection 
program  
U.S.A. Water source 
protection 
Farms on the upper 
stream of Catskill 
watershed 
Residents of New 
York City 
(Appleton, 
2002) 
7. Wimmera 
auction for 
salinity 
outcomes 
Australia salinity 
control 
(maintaining 
hydrological 
balances) 
Landowners 
grazing on steep 
slopes in the 
upstream region of 
Wimmera 
catchment 
Downstream water 
users 
(Whitten and 
Shelton, 
2005) 
8. REDD+ Inter-
national 
Carbon 
sequestration 
by reducing 
deforestation 
and forest 
degradation 
Governments and 
landowners in 
developing 
countries 
The global society. 
Funding comes from 
governments and 
private sectors in 
developed countries. 
(Corbera and 
Schroeder, 
2011; 
Corbera, 
2012; Farrell, 
2014) 
9. Payments 
for 
hydrological 
Mexico Watershed 
protection 
Communal and 
individual forest 
owners 
All water users; the 
project is financed 
through earmarked 
(Muñoz-Piña 
et al., 2008; 
Balderas 
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environmenta
l services 
fees from water 
users. 
Torres et al., 
2013) 
10. Payments 
for 
environmenta
l services 
program 
Costa 
Rica 
Water, 
biodiversity, 
carbon 
sequestration 
Private landowners, 
indigenous groups 
Tourism industry, 
water users 
(Pagiola, 
2008; Wunder 
et al., 2008) 
 
In large national projects such as cases 1, 2, 9, and 10, the ecosystem services providers are small 
farmers or herders, who are in many cases located on marginal or remote land and have relatively 
lower income levels. The beneficiaries of the ecosystem services are, however, not easy to clearly 
identify due to the large geographical scale of these projects. But note that these projects all involve 
watershed ecosystem services, so the residents of the downstream regions are the major 
beneficiaries. At the same time, downstream regions are generally more urbanized and 
economically developed. In the two Chinese cases (cases 1 and 2), the downstream regions are 
coastal provinces with much higher GDP per capita and population density than the national 
averages and contains megacities such as Beijing and Shanghai. In the Mexico case (case 9), the 
project is financed through earmarked fees on all metered water users, most of them living in cities. 
In the international case of REDD+ (case 8), it is stated in the program objective that funding from 
developed countries and international organizations is provided to developing countries in order 
to incentivize them to reduce deforestation and protect existing forests. 
Overall, these 10 cases suggest that the suppliers of ecosystem services are mostly from 
economically less developed regions. In cases of developed countries, these regions are less 
developed compared to the urbanized areas in the same country, such as in case 6, where the 
income level of upper New York State is significantly lower than that of New York City. While 
the beneficiaries, thus the potential buyers of ecosystem services, are usually from more developed 
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regions with higher income levels. The following section shows how the regional wealth disparity 
and distribution of ecosystem services could serve as favorable conditions for PES projects in 
China. 
3.4 China’s socioeconomic and ecological contexts 
China has a large number of government-led PES projects, some of them with very large scales 
that have enrolled more than one hundred million of small farmers, such as the Cropland 
Conversion Program and the Three River Sources Ecological Restoration Program (Liu et al., 
2008a). Sections 4 and 5 present the socioeconomic, ecological, and institutional factors in China, 
in order to demonstrate that China has many favorable conditions to apply PES, and its potential 
to expand and improve PES programs to further address the environmental and social challenges 
is very promising. 
Examples of PES projects in section 3 have illustrated that large wealth disparity, particularly 
regional wealth disparity, could increase the likelihood of PES projects to be successful, because 
wealthy people tend to have high WTP for ecosystem services, while poor landowners tend to be 
willingness to accept lower payments for providing ecosystem services. This condition is generally 
met in China due to geographical and sociopolitical reasons. 
Geographically, China’s topography can be divided into three levels according to altitude, from 
the highest level of Qinghai-Tibetan plateau in the west, to the other three plateaus in the middle, 
and finally to the big plains in the east. The eastern big plains have been densely populated for 
thousands of years by agriculturalists, while the western plateaus are generally occupied by a 
mixture of agriculturalists and pastoralists with much lower density.  
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During a long historical period, regional wealth disparity between the west and east had not been 
significant, because both the agriculturalists and pastoralists were subsistence farmers and were 
not much involved in a market economy, though trading activities always exist at a certain level. 
Radical changes happened after the Chinese revolution in 1950s, when the government 
collectivized most of the production materials all over the country and strictly limited private 
properties. These extreme practices severely disturbed social and economic systems, and pushed 
the whole economy to the edge of collapse. Then in 1978 the central government initiated another 
radical move, which privatized most farmland and grassland in the country, even though officially 
the households only had the rights to use the land, while the state maintained ultimate ownership. 
At the same time, the government began to gradually allow market activities and private 
enterprises. One central policy that substantially widened the regional wealth gap in China is called 
“allowing a portion of population to become rich first”, which means due to limited resources, the 
state could not treat all parts of the country evenly, but had to prioritize certain regions to let them 
develop first. The coastal provinces were selected as the “portion of population” because of their 
convenient transportation conditions as well as other factors, and the country invested most of its 
financial and social resources in the coastal provinces in the last two decades of twentieth century 
to help them industrialize. This explicit regional discrimination in central policy has rarely been 
blamed, because it turned out to be very effective in economic growth for the country as a whole. 
But over the last three decades it has also created remarkable wealth gap between the east and the 
west parts of the country. Figure 3.2 shows the spatial distribution of China’s population, GDP in 
total and GDP per capita by province in 2010. GDP per capita in coastal provinces is 3-5 times of 
that in the western provinces, and such a wide gap between regions in the same country is a rare 
phenomenon worldwide. 
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Figure 
3.2 China’s GDP and population distributions by province in 2010 
 
Even though the western part of China is economically less developed, it has very high potential 
to provide various ecosystem services that directly benefit the people in the eastern part, including 
water resources, soil erosion control, and eco-tourism (Tang et al., 2006; Feng et al., 2007). 
Because of the topography, many major rivers in China, most importantly Yangtze and Yellow 
Rivers, flow from west to east. Protecting the headwaters regions could not only improve water 
quality in downstream areas, but also reduce flood risks in the big plains (Qian et al., 2006; Liu et 
al., 2008b). Soil erosion is another serious concern the residents in eastern China have about the 
western part. Beijing and other major cities in eastern China suffer from severe dust storms in 
springs, and researchers believe one of the major sources of the dust is the deserts in western China 
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(Sun et al., 2001; Qian et al., 2002). Therefore it is crucial to prevent the agricultural and pastoral 
lands in the west from desertification in order to control the dust storms. Western China also has 
some of the most popular tourist destinations in China, most of them are featured by their pristine 
natural sceneries that are rarely seen in eastern China (Liu and Diamond, 2005). Eco-tourism is 
becoming a rapidly growing industry in western China and attracts increasing number of visitors 
from eastern provinces (Nianyong and Zhuge, 2001; Zhuang et al., 2011).  
The analyses above demonstrate that China meets some critical requirements for pro-poor PES to 
be effective, including that China has wide regional wealth disparity between the east and the west, 
and that the economically less developed regions coincide with the regions that have high potential 
in ecosystem services provision. But these conditions solely could not guarantee the success of 
PES projects, because PES is about transactions of non-market goods, which are not likely to 
happen naturally due to free-rider problems and high transaction costs, and requires specific 
institutional settings (Champ et al., 2003; Freeman, 2003). The following section argues that 
besides the socioeconomic and ecological factors, China also has the institutional contexts that are 
favorable for the implementation of PES projects.  
3.5 China’s institutional contexts 
China’s current political scheme was evolved from a central planning system established after the 
Chinese Revolution. After the 1980s even though the state liberalized many sectors in the economy, 
the central government still plays critical roles in economic and social activities, and is featured 
by top-down administrative approaches. While this political system has certain disadvantages, 
such as limited localized information the central planners could obtain, low efficiency of the 
bureaucratic regime, and lack of accountability mechanisms, it also has certain advantages in 
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various situations, and it is important to exploit its advantages and avoid its disadvantages. Public 
goods management could possibly be an advantage of this system, particularly the implementation 
of PES, due to the following reasons. 
First, pro-poor PES projects require that economically disadvantaged people have secured property 
rights to their land, thus have the potential to provide ecosystem services. This condition is not met 
in many countries where poor people usually do not own land large enough to make a difference 
in ecosystem services provision. But China’s special historical policies ensure that the rural 
residents have secured property rights to their land. In the early Twentieth Century China had very 
serious land grab problems that most of the farmland was accumulated by large landowners and 
the majority of the small farmers were deprived of their land. But during the Chinese revolution, 
the lands of large owners were confiscated by the government and made collectively owned. Then 
in the early 1980s most of the land was privatized, and in the same region each resident received 
roughly the same area of land with consideration of quality. Particularly, in western China, because 
the population density is low, each household could be assigned a large piece of land (Miller, 
2006a). Whether the property rights in China are really secured is questioned by many people, 
because there are many contemporary cases where the government and real estate developers force 
farmers to leave their land and undercompensate their losses (Chan, 2003; Ding, 2007). But during 
the past decades this new land grab movement has caused so much social turmoil that the authority 
decide to substantially raise compensation standards and try to avoid involuntary land purchases. 
So the general trend shows that property rights are becoming more and more secured in China. 
Therefore, farmers in the west are economically disadvantaged, but are owners of large landscapes 
and thus are potential ecosystem services providers. 
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Second, a big challenge for PES projects is that the funding generated by the projects is not 
sufficient to incentivize people to participate, not to say to improve the standard of living of rural 
people. A large regional wealth disparity, as discussed in sections 3 and 4, could help overcome 
this barrier. On top of that, this financial challenge could also be solved in China by combining 
poverty alleviation funding and eco-compensation funding. The Chinese government has big 
investments in both environmental protection and poverty alleviation. In 2012, central government 
investment in eco-compensation was ￥78 billion (~ $12.5 billion), and the investment in poverty 
alleviation was ￥299.6 billion (~ $48 billion), almost four times as much. And most importantly, 
these two funding sources are both aimed at helping rural people in western provinces.  But these 
two types of programs are conducted by different divisions of the government: the former usually 
by the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Environmental Protection, and the latter by the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs, and the coordination between them is generally poor. Thus, the 
opportunity for China is not just using funding from PES to help the poor, but combining 
environmental protection and poverty alleviation funding together to achieve both goals when the 
targeted groups of the two programs are the same. This would require deep integration of the two 
types of programs from designing to implementation, and close coordination and collaboration 
between the relevant ministries and agencies. This fundamentally different feature of the proposed 
approach substantially increases the offers for ecosystem services, and thus could make the 
incentive-based methods more powerful and effective. 
And lastly, the institutional structures in China allow it to overcome the political obstacles and 
procedural frictions, and develop this type of wealth transferring PES schemes. Many of the 
existing pro-poor PES projects are between developed and developing countries (Milder et al., 
2010), but the lack of powerful international institutions paralyzes these payment and ecosystem 
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services provision schemes. The uniqueness of China is that, while within the same country there 
are highly industrialized and much less developed provinces, China’s highly centralized taxation 
and fiscal systems enable the central government to transfer money between provinces as long as 
it is well justified. The State Administration of Taxation collects about 70% of the national tax 
revenue, and the different levels of local taxation bureaus collect about 30%. The central 
government then refunds the local governments by direct fiscal transfer or through various 
programs. Some of the western provinces have already submitted petitions to the central 
government stating that they should receive compensation for the ecosystem services they provide, 
and some downstream industrialized provinces have also shown willingness to compensate the 
environmental protection effects in the western provinces. This provides justifications to the 
central government to fund programs proposed by this study. 
3.6 Discussion: China’s opportunities and challenges in PES 
Even though integrated PES and poverty alleviation projects require many special conditions in 
order to be successful, this chapter demonstrates that China’s ecological, socioeconomic, and 
institutional contexts satisfy these requirements in general. China has significant wealth disparity 
between the coastal provinces and the western provinces. The coastal provinces have higher 
population density, higher income level, and demand for ecosystem services from other regions, 
while the less developed western provinces coincidently have high potential for providing 
ecosystem services. Furthermore, people in the less developed regions have secure property rights 
of large areas of farmland or grassland, and thus have high potential for providing ecosystem 
services. In addition to the spatial distribution of these factors, China could integrate separate 
funding for poverty alleviation and eco-compensation into one program to generate enough 
incentives for ecosystem services provision. The highly centralized fiscal and taxation systems 
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allow the central government to conduct the wealth transferring as long as the PES scheme could 
be well justified. Because of these favorable factors in China, it is not surprising to see that there 
are many government-led PES-like projects in China, and the number and scale of these types of 
projects are expected to increase in the future.  
It is important to note, however, that China would also encounter significant challenges in applying 
integrated PES and poverty alleviation projects.  These challenges include the gap of perceptions 
of ecosystem services between policy makers and the local people, and the gap between policy 
objectives and their actual realization. This study is a “big picture” analysis of the critical factors 
that influence PES projects at macro level, but to develop an actual PES project, the institutional 
details at micro level are equally important (Farley and Costanza, 2010; Fisher, 2012; Wynne-
Jones, 2013). There are various social and cultural factors that influence the efficacy of PES 
projects. One example of the perception gap is that many western regions are populated by ethnical 
minorities who have very different cultural and religious traditions from the majority of Chinese, 
and failure to understand these factors could cause poorly designed incentives thereby reducing 
the effectiveness of such programs. The implementation of programs is another major challenge, 
often affected by the capacity and various interests of local institutions. Many government-led 
PES-like programs in China are blamed to be poorly designed and implemented, which cause 
waste of national funding, adverse effects on the local people, and underachievement in 
environmental benefits. Therefore, significant improvements are required for these programs to 
make them more scientific-based, voluntary-based, and outcome-based, in order to actually 
achieve their social and environmental objectives. In conclusion, the opportunities for integrated 
PES and poverty alleviation projects in China are impressive, but the challenges are also 
substantial. Scholars, practitioners, and policy makers of PES projects in China should have 
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cautious optimism about the future of such projects. In Chapter 4 I will present the results of an 
empirical study on a large-scale PES program on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, China to illustrate 
the opportunities and challenges of PES in China in a real world setting. 
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CHAPTER 4 PROMISE AND REALITY OF MARKET-BASED 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN CHINA: EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF THE 
ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION PROGRAM ON THE QINGHAI-TIBETAN 
PLATEAU 
Abstract 
Market-based environmental policies have been eagerly promoted in China in the past two decades 
as a cost-effective alternative to government command and control approach. But the actual 
realization of the market-based logic and the effectiveness of such programs are widely questioned 
by scientists and policy analysts. This chapter reports empirical analyses on the design, 
implementation, and outcomes of the ecological restoration program in the Three Rivers 
Headwaters Region in China, a large-scale market-based scheme aiming at restoring degraded 
grasslands and improving local livelihoods. Results indicate that the market mechanisms in this 
program were largely paralyzed by the absence of scientific-based measurements, lack of 
accountability, and poor monitoring and enforcement. In addition, the mandatory enrollment in the 
program caused local herders to be negatively impacted. On the other hand, the analysis of attitudes 
of local herders shows that if the incentives were properly designed and implemented, 67% of 
them would voluntarily participate in the program. This suggests that the market-based ecological 
restoration schemes have great potential in achieving environmental and social benefits if the 
principles of scientific-based measurements, voluntary-based participation, and performance-
based payments are ensured.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Market-based environmental policies have emerged as a worldwide ideology in environmental 
management since the 1980s. Often referred to as “neoliberal environmental policies”, they use 
economic incentives to align stakeholders’ interests with environmental conservation goals 
(Bakker, 2005; Castree, 2008). The common forms of market-based approaches include 
environmental taxes and compensations, payments for ecosystem services, and emission permits 
trading (Heynen and Robbins, 2005; Wunder, 2005; Engel et al., 2008; Gómez-Baggethun et al., 
2010; Vatn, 2010). China has been an enthusiastic advocate of market-based environmental 
policies since the early 1980s, when the country began to liberalize most of its economic sectors 
from a highly centralized planning system (Bennett, 2008; Liu et al., 2008a). The neoliberal 
economic policies achieved remarkable success in economic development during the past three 
decades, and gradually became the new doctrine for policy making in many different fields, 
including environmental management. The Eleventh Five-year National Economic and Social 
Development Plan in 2006, the highest level national plan in China, stated that “…market 
mechanisms should be utilized in environmental policies to optimize resource allocation, resolve 
interest conflicts, and solve environmental problems…using eco-compensation schemes to 
incentivize environmental conservation and improve standard of living of the rural population”. 
As a result, there is a  remarkable number of market-based environmental programs at both national 
and local levels, exemplified by the widely cited Slope Land Conversion program (Bennett, 2008; 
Liu et al., 2008a) and the Beijing-Miyun Water Rights Trading Program (Peisert and Sternfeld, 
2005). But the implementation and outcomes of these programs are controversial. Some 
researchers argue that most of these programs are not really “market-based”, since they are still 
conducted in a mandatory manner and lack real voluntary participation, which is the spirit of the 
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market-based approach (Bennett, 2008; Liu et al., 2008a; Wunder et al., 2008). In addition to 
environmental conservation goals, China’s market-based programs usually have poverty 
alleviation goals, however, their efficacy in achieving either the desired environmental or social 
benefits is widely questioned. Thus, examining the design and implementation of market-based 
programs, and assessing their effectiveness and efficiency, are very relevant to both environmental 
research and policy making in China. 
This chapter reports empirical analyses of the eco-compensation and relocation programs under 
“The Three-Rivers Headwater Nature Reserve Ecological Protection and Construction Program” 
(TREPCP), a large-scale conservation program the Chinese government initiated in the alpine 
grassland regions of the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau. The goals of government program are to restore 
degraded grassland ecosystems and improve the standard of living of local residents. Like many 
other contemporary programs in China, the official documents of this program emphasize the 
market-based scheme as key strategy in its implementation. In this regard, the plan intends to 
provide economic incentives to local herders to reduce grazing pressure on grasslands, hence 
improving their standards of living by providing an additional income source while alleviating the 
degradation of the grassland ecosystem.  
The first phase of the program started in 2005, and the government invested 7.5 billion RMB (~ 
$1.2 billion) for the directed relocation and sedentarization of local herders, compensation for 
herders’ sacrifices in reducing livestock sizes, as well as other ecological restoration actions in 
relevant subprograms. The second phase plan, which was approved by the State Council in 2014, 
is intended to scale up the first phase programs, with the investment of more than 16 billion RMB 
(about $2.67 billion) from 2014 to 2020. With such an immense size and scope, it has become 
evident that the TREPCP program could fundamentally change the socioeconomic structures and 
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lifestyles of the traditional pastoralist societies in this region. Thus it is crucial to assess the 
program’s positive and negative impacts on both the local societies and ecosystems.  
My study focuses on examining the design and implementation of the market-based policies 
through the TREPCP program, assessing effectiveness both in ecological restoration and in 
poverty alleviation, and evaluating the willingness of local herders to participate in the relocation 
or eco-compensation programs. The goal of my study is to draw lessons from the first phase of 
this program, and offer recommendations for improvements during the second phase. A desired 
outcome of our study at a higher level, is ultimately to inform and help improve China’s market-
based environmental policies. 
4.2 Geographical and socioeconomic contexts of Three-Rivers Headwater Region 
Grassland degradation and its impacts on local pastoralist societies on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, 
China have attracted extensive attention from scientists and policy makers during the past decade 
(Zhou et al., 2005; Dong et al., 2010; Harris, 2010). The Three-Rivers Headwater Region (TRHR), 
located at the heart of the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, fosters some of the most unique ecosystems 
and cultures in the world, but it is also experiencing the most serious grassland degradation in this 
whole region. The TRHR provides important ecological functions at both local and global levels. 
It has an area of 395,000 km2, and average elevation of about 4,000 m above sea level. Alpine 
grasslands represent the dominant ecosystem in the TRHR, which harbors critical habitats for 
many endangered species, and serves as the material basis for the local pastoralist societies. Also 
of great significance, the TRHR includes the headwaters of three of the most important major 
rivers in Asia, the Yellow, the Yangtze, and the Mekong. For this reason the region is often called 
the “Water Tower of Asia”. 
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The total human population in the TRHR is 1.27 million (2011 estimate), and mostly composed of 
Tibetan nomadic pastoralist societies. The traditional pastoralist lifestyle is the result of a long 
period of adaptation to the harsh climatic and geographical characteristics of the Qinghai-Tibetan 
Plateau (Miller, 2006a; 2006b). The local herders graze yaks, Tibetan sheep, and horses, and obtain 
almost all their living necessities from their livestock: harvesting meat and dairy products for food, 
using hairs and furs to make cloths and tents, and collecting dung for fuel. Historically, the herders 
migrated in great distances in different seasons of the year to find the most suitable pastures and 
to avoid loss from frequent natural disasters, such as droughts and snow storms. After thousands 
of years of adaption, local herders, their livestock, and the alpine grassland ecosystem developed 
delicate balances and became an integral socio-environmental system (Miller, 2006a). The health 
of the ecosystem therefore became crucial for the livelihoods and culture of pastoralist societies 
across the TRHR. 
Most studies suggest that grassland degradation in the TRHR started in the 1950s, and became 
increasingly severe after the 1980s (Wang and Cheng, 2000; Liu et al., 2006; Dong et al., 2010; 
Harris, 2010). There are generally two competing explanations for the primary causes of grassland 
degradation: natural factors and anthropogenic factors (Dong et al., 2012). Researchers in the first 
camp believe that the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau is more sensitive to climate change than other 
regions, due to its vulnerable ecosystems, shrinking glacial system, and declining permafrost layers. 
Meteorological data suggest that the annual average temperature in the TRHR has risen for 0.5 °C 
in the past 50 years, which would increase evapotranspiration and decrease soil water content; 
declining glaciers also reduce the recharge of hydrological systems; and most importantly, rising 
temperature disturbs the freezing-thaw process of the active layer of the permafrost, which 
significantly influences soil conditions and hydrological processes. The combination of these 
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natural factors could likely have led to large-scale grassland degradation in this region (Klein et 
al., 2004; Song et al., 2009; Harris, 2010). Researchers in the second camp, however, argue that 
the drastic socioeconomic changes that coincided with grassland degradation after the 1950s are 
more likely to be the major causes of grassland degradation (Banks, 2003; Yan et al., 2005; Harris, 
2010). The first significant socioeconomic change in this region was population growth. 
Population in the TRHR quadrupled over the last 60 years, with a proportionally dramatic growth 
of livestock populations. This trend supports the official explanation that overgrazing is the major 
driver of grassland degradation. But, the TRHR has the lowest population density among all 
regions in China, and there are pastures elsewhere in China that sustain higher human populations 
and livestock densities while remain in a relatively healthy state. Thus, there is some doubt whether 
overgrazing is the sole explanation.  
Other researchers have examined the relationship between grassland degradation and historical 
changes in property ownership patterns (Banks, 2003; Yan et al., 2005; Dong et al., 2007). In the 
late 1950s, traditional nomadic societies were transformed into socialistic production communes. 
Nomadic herders were organized into large state farms and made their decisions on grazing 
strategies and grassland use collectively. In order to achieve increasing production goals, very 
large livestock herds were grazed on high-yielding pastures, which caused their rapid degradation. 
Another radical ownership pattern change started in the 1980s, when each household was allocated 
a set amount of grassland with a long-term, renewable contract (30-70 years), resulting in the de 
facto privatization of the grassland region. The rationale for this reform was that by assigning 
property rights to individual households, the herders would be incentivized to use and protect their 
pastures rationally. Along with grassland privatization came government programs to encourage 
sedentarization of nomadic herders so that the government could better provide education, 
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healthcare, transportation, and other services for them. But, there were problems associated with 
privatization and sedentarization of traditional pastoralist societies. First, the nomadic herders did 
not have a tradition of actively managing stationary pastures, and the knowledge and custom of 
rangeland management could not be expected to become established in a short period of time. 
Second, privatization restricted the range of migration of herders into their own pastures (Liao et 
al., 2014), which limited their ability to adapt to large variations in climate and grassland yields 
on the plateau. These dramatic socioeconomic changes within a short period could seriously have 
disturbed the balance between society and the ecosystem, and could have greatly impacted 
grassland degradation. Further exacerbating the shifts in human activities, the increasing intensity 
of infrastructure construction and mining activities in this region are also considered to have 
contributed to grassland degradation (Harris, 2010). 
4.3 Eco-compensation and relocation programs in the TRHR 
The Chinese government is very concerned about the ecological crisis and local livelihoods in this 
region, and initiated “The Three-Rivers Headwater Nature Reserve Ecological Protection and 
Construction program” in 2005, a large-scale national program aimed at comprehensively 
restoring the ecosystems and overhauling the socioeconomic systems in the TRHR. It consists of 
a series of subprograms, including grazing bans, relocation of people, eco-compensation, 
restoration of degraded grasslands, cultivation of grasslands, livestock shelter construction, and 
others. Two of the most important components in the broader TREPCP program are eco-
compensation and relocation programs, which are most heavily invested and are considered to be 
critical for grassland restoration and livelihood enhancement, but also have great potential for 
unintended impacts on the wellbeing of local herders. 
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The official rationale of China’s grassland restoration policy is based on the assumption that 
overgrazing and other human activities are the primary drivers of degradation. Therefore, reducing 
pressure on grasslands will result from reductions in populations of humans and livestock. 
Ecologists in government agencies have calculated the carrying capacity per unit of grassland at 
which the grassland yield and livestock population could reach theoretical equilibrium. Using this 
value, they claim that the carrying capacity for the whole TRHR is 9.27 million sheep units (one 
horse is equivalent to six sheep and one yak is equivalent to four sheep). However, the actual 
livestock population, according to the TRHR second phase plan, is 18.29 million sheep units, 
almost twice of the theoretical carrying capacity. Therefore to reach the calculated equilibrium 
point, the TRHR needs to reduce its total livestock by nearly 50%. 
Currently the government bans grazing activities on some of the most seriously degraded 
grasslands, building fences to protect them and relocating the local residents. The relocated people 
are usually resettled in newly built villages adjacent to cities or towns, and are provided apartments 
built by the government. Although infrastructure conditions are generally improved and they have 
better access to healthcare and education services, there can be considerable hardships during their 
transition from pastoralists to urban citizens. For compensation, the government promised to 
provide them 8,000 RMB (~$1,300) per person annually for ten years, as well as some training 
programs to help them find alternative livelihoods, such as driving taxies or making traditional 
Tibetan handcrafts as tourist souvenirs. But, notably, most of the relocated herders did not have 
advanced skills and ultimately become unemployed or end up taking low paying construction jobs. 
The compensation amount is decent according to China’s average standard of living, but the 
herders have to significantly change their lifestyle and diet structure. For example, they used to be 
subsistence pastoralists, but now needed to buy everything in commercial markets; and no longer 
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being able to afford a daily consumption of yak meat and dairy products, they have had to adapt 
to eating more grain and cereal products. In addition, there is no guarantee for income after the 
end of the compensation period.  
The majority of the herders are allowed to stay on their grassland, but are required to reduce 
livestock densities in order to mitigate grazing pressures. If the government classifies grassland as 
“seriously or moderately degraded”, there is a complete grazing ban. If the land is classified as 
“slightly degraded”, the government limits the number of livestock. According to national 
grassland compensation standards, annual compensation is 10 RMB per mu (~$25 per ha) for 
grasslands where grazing is banned, and 1.5 RMB per mu for grasslands with limited grazing. The 
grasslands are re-evaluated and reclassified every five years in order to reflect the temporal 
changes in grassland condition. In theory, the classification should be based on the ecological 
conditions of the grassland. But in practice political considerations to evenly distribute 
compensation funding among administrative districts and households often outweigh ecological 
considerations. For example, statistical data may show that, overall, a county is composed of 40% 
seriously or moderately degraded grassland, and 60% slightly degraded grassland. To distribute 
the compensation and impacts evenly among households, government agencies may decree that 
each household has 40% seriously degraded grassland and 60% slightly degraded land. This allows 
each household to receive some higher compensation, while retaining the rights for limited grazing 
on the majority of their land. Since fine-scale classification is rarely based on ecological conditions, 
the effectiveness in achieving grassland restoration objectives is largely sacrificed. In addition, 
because of the technical difficulties and high costs associated with monitoring individual 
household grazing activities, grazing bans and limits are often not enforced. The large part of the 
local government agencies’ job is just to distribute compensation funding to the herders. 
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The second phase of the TRHR ecological restoration program was approved by the State Council 
in 2014, and will be conducted from 2014 to 2020. The program plan states that most of the 
subprograms in the first phase had been completed by 2013 and had generated significant 
ecological and social benefits; but since the grassland degradation problem still exists and keeps 
threatening local livelihoods, it is necessary to conduct the program’s second phase. This phase, 
which plans to double the investment and scale up the existing subprograms, would primarily 
continue with the direction and implementing strategies in the first phase.  
In this chapter I argue that it is crucial to examine the reasons for the shortfalls of the first phase 
program in achieving its environmental and social objectives, in order to address possible problems 
that may arise during the program’s second phase. The assumptions that banning grazing and 
reducing livestock density could lead to restoration of degraded grasslands, and that relocation and 
eco-compensation could improve the wellbeing of the local herders, need to be critically 
reexamined. In addition, the discrepancy between the designing principles of the program, 
particularly its market-based logic, and the implementation of the program through mandatory and 
bureaucratic manners, could also prevent the program from achieving its environmental and social 
objectives. The following sections present the results of empirical analyses of the program’s 
efficacy in ecological restoration, its impacts on local herders, and the local herders’ attitudes 
toward relocation and eco-compensation programs. 
4.4 Methodology 
This study analyzes the design, implementation, and outcomes of the TRHR ecological restoration 
program at three levels: the design of the program at central and provincial levels, the 
implementation of the program at the county level, and the impacts of the program at the household 
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level. Firstly, I analyzed relevant legislations, government documents, and statistics from the 
central and provincial governments to understand the rationales behind the design of the program. 
“The Three-Rivers Headwater Nature Reserve Ecological Protection and Construction Program 
Overall Implementation Plan” is the overarching blueprint that includes the rationales, strategies, 
and implementation guidelines for all the subprograms. Different levels of local governments also 
enacted various guidelines and explanations for the overall implementation plan, in order to better 
suit the program to local contexts. These documents were all critically reviewed to gain the 
procedural details of this program. Secondly, I conducted open-ended interviews with local 
government officials to obtain information about the details of implementation of the program and 
how it differs from the original design. The officials I interviewed included the head of the 
Prefecture Agricultural and Husbandry Bureau, staff who were responsible for monitoring and 
enforcing livestock reduction policies, and supervisors for the eco-compensation programs. Some 
results from the government documents analysis and key personnel interviews have been 
incorporated in section 3. 
Thirdly and most importantly, I conducted 202 household surveys with local herders in summer 
2013 to understand their perceptions of grassland degradation and attitudes about the relocation 
and eco-compensation programs. The surveys were conducted in a face-to-face manner, usually 
with a Tibetan translator involved in the process. Selection of the interviewees was based on 
stratified random sampling. I first selected six out of the 16 counties within the TRHR (Figure 4.1), 
according to geographic distribution, political districts, amount of degraded grassland, and river 
basins. The households interviewed were randomly selected and approximately evenly distributed 
across each county. Questionnaires consisted of multiple choice questions and open-ended 
questions. The questions were divided into seven sections, including: basic observed information 
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(landscape types, transportation conditions, and housing conditions that the interviewer could 
observe); grazing information (numbers of yaks, Tibetan sheep, and horses, area of grassland, 
grazing practices, etc.); household budget (income from grazing and other sources, expenses in 
food, healthcare, education, entertainments, etc.); herders’ perception of the extend of degradation 
of their grasslands; eco-compensation information (the actual money they received from current 
programs, along with duration and process of current compensation); willingness to participate in 
relocation or eco-compensation programs (were they willing to participate, and if so, what was the 
minimum amount of compensation they are willing to accept); and household basic information 
(age, gender, education, etc.) (Appendix A). Each survey process took about 30 minutes. The 
analysis and results of the collected data are presented in the following sections.  
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Figure 4.1 The Three River Headwaters Region (the red regions are the counties where interviews 
were conducted) 
4.5 Results and discussion 
The 202 local herders who participated in the face-to-face surveys were from six counties in the 
TRHR (Figure 4.1). All participants were Tibetan ethnics, 74% were male, and 82% had no formal 
school education, but 56% could read and write Tibetan. Within the participants, there was a 
variety of living conditions and lifestyles, ranging from suburban or rural areas and had grasslands 
with very different areas and conditions. They variously grazed yaks, Tibetan sheep, goats, and 
horses, and herd sizes ranged from a dozen to more than 1000 animals. This section analyzes the 
survey data in two steps. I first assess the local herders’ perception of grassland degradation and 
their attitudes toward the current ecological restoration program. Next I analyze the factors that 
affect the local herders’ willingness to participate in the program. 
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Figure 4.2 Local herders’ perception of grassland degradation and attitudes toward the ecological 
restoration program 
Figure 4.2 presents the overall statistics of local herders’ perception of grassland degradation and 
attitudes toward the ecological restoration program. When asked about the condition of their 
grassland, 76% of all herders described their grassland as “seriously” or “moderately” degraded; 
only 24% said their grassland were in healthy condition. When comparing the current conditions 
of their grassland to ten years ago, 64% said their grassland was now in poorer conditions; only 
24% said the condition of their grassland was presently better compared to 10 years ago. These 
data imply that the majority of herders believe that their pastures are still experiencing certain 
levels of degradation, and that the first phase TRHR ecological restoration program has fallen short 
in achieving its ecological goals after eight years of implementation. 
The local herders’ attitudes toward the program to compensate them for reducing livestock number 
(eco-compensation) were mixed. About 40% supported the program, believing that it had been 
good for the health of their grassland, and could generate new income source for their households 
and improve their standard of living. 12% of those surveyed thought the program was fair and was 
willing to participate if compensation was high enough. Another 40% disliked the program; and 
the rest (4%) thought the effects are mixed or had no idea. Further analysis of the 40% of 
interviewees who dislike the program indicated that these individuals could be classified in two 
groups. The first group, including about 27% of interviewees, disliked the current program because 
they did not want to change their traditional ways of life, which had cultural and social significance 
for them. People in this group are not likely to reduce their livestock numbers or change their 
practices in response to monetary incentives. However, the second group, 13% of those 
interviewed, disliked the program because they were concerned that the compensation amount was 
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too low or would last only for a short period, or that because corruption in the program, 
compensation may not ever be distributed. Thus, it may be possible to change the attitudes of 
people in the second group by changing the design and implementation of compensation policies. 
Added to the people who were positive or neutral about the program, it is likely that 67%, or two 
thirds of the population, would be willing to participate in the ecological restoration program if the 
incentives were well designed. 
In comparison, the majority of the interviewees disliked the policy of compensation for relocation; 
only less than 20% thought it was good. Compared to compensation for reducing livestock number, 
relocation was less acceptable for local herders due to its radical changes to their lifestyles on 
many levels. Therefore, mandatory relocation could cause significant negative impacts on the 
wellbeing of the local herders, and should not be the major component in the restoration program. 
When asked what they were required to do after receiving the compensation for reducing livestock 
or banning grazing, 61% herders said they were not required to do anything, and they thought the 
compensation was mostly provided as financial aid or for poverty reduction. One third of the 
herders interviewed said they were told to reduce their livestock numbers, and only 3% said they 
were told to stop grazing on certain grassland. However, only a small proportion actually did either; 
and those who did not obey the grazing ban or reduce their herd sizes did not face any punishment. 
This indicated that enforcement of the compensation policy was very poor during the program’s 
first phase: the money was distributed, but few herders actually reduced their livestock number or 
curtailed grazing. This reality may make the government even more inclined to use mandatory 
relocation as a major strategy to reducing total livestock number, which might in turn cause more 
unintended negative impacts. 
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A Craggit analysis (Cragg, 1971; Burke, 2009) in Stata software was applied to examine the factors 
that affected local herders’ willingness to participate in the eco-compensation and relocation 
programs. The respondents were asked two questions: 1) what is the minimum amount of annual 
compensation, lasting for 10 years, that you are willing to accept for cutting your numbers of 
livestock in half, and 2) what is the minimum amount of annual compensation, lasting for 10 years, 
that you are willing to accept for quitting grazing animals altogether and moving into apartments 
provided by the government in urban areas. They were then asked to mark their answers on two 
payment cards, with numbers from 100 RMB to more than 300,000 RMB. The respondents were 
also allowed to choose “I do not want to participate in the program”. Craggit analysis has two tiers. 
Tier 1 is a Probit analysis, with the dependent variable as “0: not willing to participate” and “1: 
willing to participate”; Tier 2 is basically a linear regression model with the lower limit truncated 
at 0, and the dependent variable in tier 2 was the amount of compensation the respondents stated 
that they were willing to accept for cutting numbers of livestock in half or for relocation. Tier 2 
only includes the respondents who said to be willing to participate from tier 1. The independent 
variables are the same for both tier 1 and tier 2 (see Table 4.1). Numbers of all animals were 
converted to “total sheep units” according to official standards: one yak equals four sheep units, 
and one horse equals six sheep units. “Grassland area” is the total areas of summer and winter 
pastures a family owns. “Grassland ownership” could be either private or collective. “Is grass 
enough” refers to whether a family needs to buy fodder from others in an ordinary year. 
“Alternative livelihoods” reflect the income sources of a family: for some families, grazing is the 
sole income source; but other families may run businesses besides grazing. “Landscape type” 
refers to the location of the house or pasture, and could be either suburban or rural. “Transportation 
condition” reflects whether the family has easy access to major roads. “Your age”, “gender”, and 
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“your education” are the basic demographic information of the respondents. “Family member 
education” refers to whether family members have middle school education or above. Whether 
there are “monks in family” is used as an indicator for the influence of religion and traditional 
culture. 
Table 4.1 Craggit analysis for the factors that influence willingness to accept (WTA) 
 WTA for compensation  WTA for relocation 
 Coef. z P>z  Coef. z P>z 
        
Tier1 (Whether or not be willing to participate) 
Total sheep units1 -0.001 -3.21 0.001***  -0.001 -2.31 0.021** 
Grassland area -2.43E-06 -0.14 0.885  -1.97E-06 -0.08 0.937 
Grassland ownership 0.224 0.59 0.558  0.062 0.18 0.856 
Is grass enough -0.137 -0.61 0.544  0.083 0.38 0.704 
Alternative livelihoods -0.041 -0.16 0.876  -0.158 -0.63 0.528 
Landscape type 0.184 0.5 0.619  -0.619 -1.38 0.168 
Transportation condition -0.017 -0.06 0.95  0.084 0.33 0.743 
Your age -0.017 -1.82 0.068*  -0.009 -1.02 0.307 
Gender 0.356 1.26 0.209  0.095 0.38 0.702 
Your education 0.504 1.49 0.137  -0.050 -0.17 0.864 
Family member education 0.028 0.21 0.833  0.143 1.21 0.228 
Monks in family -0.146 -0.38 0.702  0.348 0.95 0.343 
_cons 1.224 2.53 0.012  -0.063 -0.14 0.886 
        
Tier2 (If willing to participate, the amount of compensation willing to accept) 
Total sheep units 53.69 1.28 0.202  145.73 2.28 0.022** 
Grassland area 2.95 2.12 0.034**  0.36 0.07 0.941 
Grassland ownership -21657.24 -0.67 0.505  34655.22 0.76 0.448 
Is grass enough 40196.49 1.95 0.051*  19785.94 0.62 0.535 
Alternative livelihoods -52530.13 -2.19 0.029**  28737.82 0.81 0.419 
Landscape type -14162.5 -0.4 0.689  114073.5 1.44 0.151 
Transportation condition -8443.65 -0.35 0.727  -100006 -2.47 0.014** 
Your age -356.68 -0.41 0.685  -4.22 0 0.997 
Gender -7470.17 -0.29 0.775  -50168.07 -1.34 0.182 
Your education 4442.31 0.18 0.859  17690.08 0.43 0.664 
Family member education 5319.07 0.45 0.652  -72512.23 -3.1 0.002*** 
Monks in family 2230.57 0.07 0.947  52753.8 1.21 0.226 
_cons 91760.13 2 0.045  239453 3.85 0 
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*: 90% confident level; **: 95% confident level; ***: 99% confident level.  
1: One yak equals four sheep units, and one horse equals six sheep units. 
 
Tier 1 analysis of the eco-compensation program indicated that the total sheep units owned by a 
family had significant influence on their decision on whether or not to participate. People owning 
less livestock are more inclined to participate, since their loss from reducing livestock number in 
half is relatively small, and they have relatively low income from grazing and thus are more 
motivated to find new income sources. There is a negative correlation between the age of the 
respondents and their willingness to participate. Younger people tended to be more interested in 
the program, which is consistent with the results of my open-ended interviews that compared to 
older people who are mostly traditional herders, the younger generation is more willing to take 
other occupations and change their lifestyle and practices. For those who are willing to participate 
in the eco-compensation program, tier 2 analysis showed that grassland area and grassland 
condition (“Is grass enough”) have positive correlations with the minimum amount of 
compensation they were willing to accept. Herders whose grassland could not yield enough grass 
for the livestock tended to ask for lower amounts of compensation for reducing half of their 
livestock, likely because they face pressure to reduce livestock even without the program. This is 
consistent with the main goal of the program, which is to restore poor-quality grasslands. In 
addition, herders having alternative livelihoods to grazing asked for less compensation. If grazing 
was their only source of income, herders would suffer greatly from reducing their herd sizes and 
thus require much higher compensations for doing so. 
For the relocation program, the number of livestock (i.e., total sheep units) was the only significant 
factor in the tier 1 analysis, meaning that it is unlikely to expect people owning large numbers of 
livestock to abandon grazing and relocate to cities or towns. In the tier 2 analysis, total sheep units 
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were positively correlated with the minimum amount of compensation respondents requested; 
transportation condition and family member education had negative correlations with the amount 
of compensation. It is possible that households with better transportation conditions may have 
more opportunities to obtain information and learn new skills, and thus have fewer barriers and 
frustrations associated with adapting to urban life,  and would require less compensation compared 
to those who live in more remote areas. In the TRHR only large towns or county seats have middle 
schools and high schools, which are usually very far from herders' homes. To alleviate this 
situation, many families with children in middle school rent houses closer to schools to take care 
of their children. Therefore, it is reasonable that these families would ask for less compensation 
for being relocated to towns or cities. 
4.6 Conclusions and recommendations 
Market-based environmental policies are considered to have more flexibility and efficiency 
compared to traditional command and control approaches. According to previous research and my 
own study, herders on more degraded grasslands are more willing to participate in an eco-
compensation program and to accept relatively low compensation for changing their grazing 
patterns and practices. From the government’s perspective, enrolling these herders and restoring 
their degraded grasslands could maximize the ecological benefits with a given budget. In addition, 
if the participation in the program is voluntary, there would be minimum negative impacts on local 
people, since those who would likely be adversely affected could choose not to participate and to 
continue their way of life. Therefore, the market-based scheme could be ecologically effective in 
grassland restoration, economically efficient for the government, and socially acceptable to local 
people. 
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It is evident, however, from my study that the market-based logic was not actually realized in the 
eco-compensation program in the TRHR. Ecological efficacy of the program was often sacrificed 
to political considerations when distributing the financial resources; the area of grassland classified 
as seriously, moderately, or slightly degraded was not primarily determined by ecological metrics, 
but rather by compensation quota assigned to an administrative district. In addition, lack of 
accountability and efficiency in the bureaucratic system caused poor enforcement of livestock 
reduction requirements, and in most cases the herders who received compensation did not even 
know its purpose. In general, flawed design and implementation caused the failure of the first 
phase ecological program to achieve its environmental and social goals. 
Ineffectiveness of the eco-compensation program may make the government more inclined to rely 
on mandatory relocations to reduce grazing pressure on grasslands. But relocation and completely 
abandoning grazing cause drastic changes to local communities. According to my survey results, 
only a small proportion of herders are willing to move to towns or cities. The THRH has few 
industries, and job opportunities are very limited in urban areas, particularly for the relocated 
herders with low working skills. Thus, for the relocated herders, the annual government 
compensation became the major income source for many families, but the compensation only lasts 
for 10 years, and whether it will be extended is presently unclear. Moreover, pastoralism has 
cultural and religious significances for the local societies, so a relocation program could cause 
various social problems among communities. 
This study suggests that market-based environmental policies have the potential to restore 
degraded ecosystems and improve local livelihoods in the TRHR if they are properly designed and 
implemented. Both the government and the local herders are concerned about ecosystem health, 
and well-designed incentives could encourage local herders to adopt ecologically friendly grazing 
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practices. My survey showed that up to two thirds of the population could be potential participants 
of the market-based scheme. But in order to achieve its benefits, the current ecological restoration 
program needs to be overhauled in its design and implementation. Based on my analysis, this study 
provides three recommendations to be incorporated into the second phase of the TRHR ecological 
restoration program and future market-based schemes in China. 
Firstly, scientific-based measurements and restoration strategies should be the foundation of 
market-based environmental policies. Reliable metrics are needed to measure and assess the health 
status of grasslands for the government to invest its resources in places with maximum return of 
ecological benefits. Effective restoration strategies are also critical to accomplishing 
environmental objectives. Grazing bans and reduction of livestock densities, the dominant 
strategies in the current program, might not be the most cost-effective approaches to restoring all 
degraded grasslands. There are abundant examples in other regions indicating that with better 
grassland management and grazing practices, the grassland could be maintained in a healthy state, 
even with much higher livestock densities (Klein et al., 2004; Harris, 2010). Moreover, paying 
herders to adopt better practices, rather than reducing livestock numbers, might be more acceptable 
to the herders and more likely to improve their wellbeing. Therefore, the program should 
incorporate multiple grassland improvement options besides grazing ban and reducing livestock 
number in order to better incentivize the herders to participate.  
Secondly, voluntary-based participation needs to be ensured to minimize the negative impacts of 
the program on local people. Market mechanisms are more likely to work if the participants are 
free to make rational decisions. The government seeks program candidates who could provide the 
most environmental benefits with a given amount of payments, and herders would only participate 
if they think the payments are higher than their costs to provide environmental benefits. The 
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government could increase the enrollment rate by creating more alternative employment 
opportunities for herders to lower their opportunity costs for participating, rather than mandate 
them to join the program. Compared to changing grazing practices, relocation is less acceptable to 
local herders due to its radical changes to their lifestyles. Therefore, it is particularly important for 
the relocation program to be voluntary-based. 
Thirdly, payments to the herders need to be outcome-based, meaning that they are conditional on 
the actual delivery of environmental benefits. The contracts between herders and the government 
need to explicitly state that the herders are expected to improve the quality of their grasslands in 
order to receive payments. The low environmental accomplishments of the first phase program are 
largely due to lack of accountability and enforcement at the local level. Local government agencies 
are not able to adequately manage the program, so other local organizations and civil society forces, 
such as herder groups in communities and non-governmental organizations, could be introduced 
to enhance monitoring and enforcement of the program. 
The results of this study not only identify problems and provide suggestions for the ecological 
restoration program in the TRHR, but they also reveal the pathways to improving China’s market-
based environmental policies in general. China’s ambition in promoting market-based 
environmental policies is widely acclaimed as a paradigm shift from command and control to 
decentralized decision making and flexible solutions. But the advantages of market mechanisms 
are largely paralyzed by the absence of scientific guidelines and the bureaucratic approaches in 
such programs. In order for market-based environmental policies to truly take effect, the principles 
of scientific-based measurements, voluntary-based participation, and outcome-based payments 
should be respected in all such programs. 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Major contributions of the dissertation 
This dissertation makes both theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature of Payments 
for Ecosystem Services (PES) and poverty alleviation in four aspects. First, it provides a new 
direction to understand the barriers for PES implementation. Unlike its promises in theory, PES 
encounters substantial obstacles in achieving its environmental and social objectives in practice. 
Previous studies on this topic mostly focused on high transaction costs, lack of scientific 
measurements, lack of institutional frameworks, or social and cultural resistances to innovations 
(Wunder, 2005; Jack et al., 2008; Milder et al., 2010; Vatn, 2010). This dissertation reexamines 
the basic assumptions for PES schemes, particularly the implications of Coase’s Theorem (Coase, 
1960) on the ratio of willingness to accept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP) and assignments 
of property rights, and demonstrates that due to the peculiarities of non-market environmental 
goods, the ratio of WTA/WTP would be very high and lead to much lower ecosystem services 
(ES) transaction rates than expected. This inherent limitation of PES, plus the external barriers 
identified by previous studies, determines that PES could be effective only under certain 
ecological, socioeconomic, and institutional contexts.  
Second, this dissertation analyzes the relationship between PES and wealth disparity, and draws a 
full picture for the demand and supply of ES. Previous literature extensively discussed the supply 
side of PES, particularly the possibilities, conditions, and mechanisms to use PES to improve the 
ES suppliers’ well-being (Pagiola et al., 2005; Milder et al., 2010). But the demand side has been 
largely underemphasized. The results of the dissertation research, however, show that targeting the 
right buyers of ES is as important as finding the right suppliers. While the low income people in 
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ES rich regions are potential candidates for ES provision, as indicated by previous studies, this 
study shows that the high income people in industrialized regions have high potential in ES 
payments.  
A certain level of wealth disparity between industrialized regions and ES-rich regions could 
facilitate the implementation of PES and increase the environmental benefits, since on the one 
hand high income population are likely to have higher willingness to pay, because their spending 
on ES is a relatively small fraction of their income, and they are more likely to care about the 
environmental qualities. On the other hand, low income population are likely to be willing to 
accept lower payments, because their opportunity costs for ES provision are relatively low, and 
they have incentives to seek alternative livelihoods in order to improve their standard of living. 
Third, this dissertation addresses the ongoing debate on whether PES should be used as a pure 
conservation tool, or should it also incorporate poverty alleviation objectives. Empirical studies 
show that the value of potential ES a small landowner can provide is usually very low (Pagiola et 
al., 2005; Milder et al., 2010), therefore an over-payment is in most cases necessary to incentivize 
the landowner to change practices. If a PES project is financed by the public sector, this over-
payment can only be justified if the landowner is in poverty and needs help to escape a poverty 
trap. Thus a PES scheme that enrolls low income landowners serves automatically as a poverty 
alleviation program, and it also needs the poverty alleviation goal to receive political support. The 
over-compensation in PES also removes the suspicion that the poor would be exploited in the 
project, and studies indicate that low income participants of PES projects usually become better 
off if participation is voluntary.  
And fourth, the empirical study on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, China, provides lessons and 
recommendations for PES in practice. This study examined the design and implementation of an 
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eco-compensation program in this region, assessed its effectiveness in ecological restoration and 
poverty alleviation, and evaluated the willingness of local herders to participate. The results show 
that even though PES could have the potential to restore the degraded ecosystems and improve 
local herders’ standards of living, its effectiveness and efficiency are comprised by bureaucratic 
implementation and involuntary enrollment. To ensure the efficacy of PES, the principles of 
scientific-based measurements, voluntary-based participation, and outcome-based payments need 
to be respected.  
5.2 The way forward to a better understanding of PES 
PES is one of the most innovative and promising environmental policy instruments that emerged 
in the past 20 years, and has great potential in addressing many complex environmental challenges. 
However, it is very important to note that PES is not a panacea for all environmental problems. 
The effectiveness of PES depends on contexts: generally, PES is suitable for issues involving 
private landowners with heterogeneous situations. In addition, it requires reliable measuring and 
monitoring techniques, capable intermediary agencies, and proper legislation supports. And most 
importantly, it needs sufficient WTP and WTA to make transactions happen. The absence of any 
of these enabling conditions would cause the failure of PES projects. PES could not replace other 
policy tools, such as government regulations, taxes, and subsidies, and community-based 
management. It needs to work with other policy instruments collaboratively or complementarily. 
It is critical to understand the strengths and limitations of PES before applying it to specific issues, 
in order to take advantage of its flexibility and efficiency and avoid its various pitfalls.  
PES should not be viewed as a pure conservation tool. Experience from other conservation 
strategies, such as national parks and grazing bans, has demonstrated that failing to consider the 
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social effects of conservation practices could create significant negative impacts on society, 
particularly its disadvantaged population. The national park movement displaced hundreds of 
thousands of indigenous people around the world, and grazing bans forced many pastoral societies 
to abandon their traditional ways of life. While many environmental policies are socially 
regressive, PES has the advantage of being socially progressive: wealthier people are likely to 
contribute more in the program, while poorer people could benefit the most, if the supply of ES is 
voluntary. Integrating social objectives into PES will not compromise its conservation 
achievements, but can gather more political and financial resources for it.   
Finally, PES is a market-based policy instrument, but it is not only about market and economics. 
While market mechanisms have the advantages of decentralized decision making, flexibility, and 
efficiency, they also have the tendency of oversimplification, standardization, and ignorance. But 
ecosystems are inherently complex and interconnected. Different ecosystems or their components 
are not always measurable and interchangeable. Even though some ecosystem functions may not 
have direct utilities to human society presently, their significance may be recognized in the future, 
and they have their intrinsic values to exist. So the design and implementation of PES need to be 
backed by solid ecological knowledge and appropriate environmental ethics. Market mechanisms 
are not prevalent in some societies, mostly indigenous societies, so monetary incentives may be in 
conflict with the norms and traditions in these societies. Implementation of PES in these societies 
needs to be cautious to avoid potential social and cultural conflicts. In sum, a well-designed PES 
program should be environmentally sustainable, economically viable, and culturally acceptable.  
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APPENDIX A  QUESTIONNAIRES 
No.                           Date: (MM/DD/YYYY)     Time:            County:     
Administrative village, Natural village:     
Basic information：Landscape type (□urban□suburban□rural) Transportation condition (□
close to main road□close to mud road□poor transportation conditions) 
 
Housing type (□tent  □house) housing condition (□very poor  □fair  □good  □very good) 
Numbering rules: 6 digits in all, the first digit is the interviewer’s No., the second and third are 
the county No., and the last three digits are the survey No..  
Introduction:  
The purpose of this research is to learn about grassland degradation and grazing practices in this 
area, about the way people live and work, and about the social and environmental problems that 
local herders face.  
We would like to ask you questions about your grassland conditions, your grazing practices, and 
your household. All the information you give will be strictly confidential. Any of the information 
you tell us will not be given to anyone outside of this project. If you would rather not answer any 
questions, please just say so. Your participation in our interview is greatly appreciated!  
1. Grazing information 
1. Total male yaks  males yaks 5 years and over   
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Total female yaks  female yaks 5 years and over   
Milk yaks  newborns this years (male and female) 
2. Total male sheep  males sheep 3 years and over   
Total female sheep female sheep 3 years and over   
Milk sheep  newborns this years (male and female)    
4. Total male horses  Total female horses  
5. Area of winter pasture：  mu Property rights (A. state owned B. collectively 
owned C. private) 
Area of summer pasture：  mu Property rights (A. state owned B. collectively 
owned C. private) 
Is there any special condition about ownership?  
Interview location is (A. summer pasture B. winter pasture) 
 
6. Date to move to summer pasture：          Date to move to winter pasture：   
2. Income and expenses 
1. Number of car/Motor cycle/Tractor/Truck   Furniture: (check all that apply), TV, 
refrigerator, washing machine, solar power2. Livestock product consumption in past 12 months 
(note if this was not an average year,and why?)       
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Number of yak slaughtered for consumption  Number of sheep slaughtered for 
consumption    
Yak/Sheep milk consumption everyday (500g)   Estimate of Yak hair consumed (500 
g)    
Estimate of Sheep wool consumed (500 g)  Number of lamb skins consumed    
Estimate of yak dung consumed (500 g)   
3. Income for past 12 months (note if this was not an average year,and why?)-RMB or amounts 
with prices 
Yak sold  Sheep sold   Horse sold     
Yak meat, hides, dung, dairy   Sheep meat, hides, dung, dairy    
Yartsa Gunbu (RMB)   
Mushrooms and other products from grassland (RMB)    
Do you have skills other than grazing to make a living? 
Do you have income sources other than grazing in the past 12 months? 
 
If yes, how much did you earn from alternative income sources in the past 12 months? 
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4. Expense for past 12 months (note if this was not an average year, and why?)-RMB or amounts 
with prices    
Food   veterinary costs   Transportation costs (moving animals) Educational 
costs   Religion and festival      
Entertainment, clothing, jewelry, healthcare, necessities    
Low monetary holding trigger: 
A. Sell a small animal (RMB)     B. Sell a large animal (RMB)    C. 
other (please specify) 
3. Perception on the condition of grassland 
1. Does your grassland  yield enough grass  for your livestock? 
In the past ten years, how many years did the grassland yield enough grass? 
Do you need to buy fodder from others every year? How much on average every year?  
Do you need to cultivate hay, how many mu every year on average?  
Compared to the condition ten years ago: today’s grassland is (1. Much worse 2. A little worse 3. 
Same 4. A little better 5. Much better) 
  
 
2. Over the past ten years, did the number of your livestock: A. increase b. decrease c. the same 
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The percentage (interviewer needs to calculate himself) 
 Did the area of your grassland A. increase b. decrease c. the same 
The percentage (interviewer needs to calculate himself) 
 
 
4. Did you use any of the following practice to protect your grassland？ 
A. reduce the number of livestock；B. cultivate grass；C. build fences；D. Other   
(If so, please provide information on number reduced, area cultivated, or percentage of grassland 
fenced) 
5. If you think the condition of your grassland is becoming worse, could you give the most 
important reasons?   
A.  Overgrazing B. Less precipitation C. rodents D. harvest fungus E. other (please specify)  
6. Which one do you think can best describe the condition of your grassland? 
A. In very good condition B. moderately degraded C. seriously degraded 
7.  Did you suffer from heavy snow in the past 5 years? If yes:Male yaks died:   Female yaks died: 
Male sheep died:  Female sheep died:  
Male horse died:  Female horse died: 
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4. Eco-compensation information 
1. Have you ever received compensation for your grassland?  
If so, from which year?  
Is the compensation based on: area of grassland; households; number of people in households; 
other (please specify) 
How much do you receive every year?   
How many years does the compensation lasts?  
 
2. What were you required to do after receiving the compensation?  
A. reducing the number of livestock, b. ban grazing c. others (please specify) D. nothing 
 
3. Are you satisfied with the amount of the compensation?  
A. very unsatisfied B. a little unsatisfied C. think it’s fair D. very satisfied 
 
 
4. Do you know other policies for grassland protection? If yes, please specify.  
 (Y/N) 
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5. Have you ever heard other people having received eco-compensation? (Y/N) 
Place: 
from which year?  
Is the compensation based on: area of grassland; households; number of people in households; 
other (please specify); don’t know 
How many years does the compensation lasts? 
If so, how was it implemented?  
 
5. Willingness to accept 
1. Please check whether you are willing to accept the amount of annual money compensation for 
ten years for cutting the number of livestock in half: (cut all types of animals in half, one time 
reduction, annual payment for 10 years; first, ask the respondent from low to high values until the 
respondent says yes; then ask the respondent from highest value to lower ones until he/she says 
no) 
 Yes No 
￥100    
￥1000    
￥2000    
￥5000    
￥10,000   
￥20,000    
￥30,000    
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￥50,000     
￥100, 000   
￥150,000   
>￥150,000   
 
What’s your attitude toward compensation for reducing livestock density?  
A. good B. either good or bad C. bad D. mixed E. no idea 
Do you have any specific comments about your concerns?  
 
 
2. Please check whether you are willing to accept the amount of annual money compensation for 
ten years for being relocated to cities or towns, with free houses: (first, ask the respondent from 
low to high values until the respondent says yes; then ask the respondent from highest value to 
lower ones until he/she says no) 
 Yes No 
￥200    
￥2000    
￥4000    
￥10,000    
￥20,000   
￥40,000    
￥60,000    
￥100,000     
￥200, 000   
￥300,000   
>￥300,000   
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What’s your attitude toward compensation for relocation?  
A. good B. either good or bad C. bad D. mixed E. no idea 
Do you have any specific comments about your concerns?  
6. Household information 
1. Number of family members       Ethnicity   
Males under 16        males 16-60        males over 60        
Females under 16        females 16-60        females over 60        
2. Your age:                  Gender:   Your education level    
Can you read (Y/N) or write (Y/N) Tibetan? Have you been a monk in a temple? (Y/N) 
3. Education level of other family members? 
Elementary school:                 Middle school:                  high school:                 college and above:     
Can read                 or write                 Tibetan     Monks:                 
7. Relocated people 
1. Where were you relocated from? In which year? How much compensation did you received 
every year? How many years can you receive the compensation?  
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2. Did you receive compensation for building new houses? If so, do you have the freedom to sell 
the house?   
 
3.  Did you receive compensation for your previous grassland? Do you still have ownership to the 
grassland?  
 
4. What is your current occupation? What are the changes in your income? 
 
 
5. Do you think your standard of living has increased or decreased? What are the changes?   
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